论人格同一性的必要性

IF 1.7 4区心理学 Q3 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL

Self and Identity Pub Date : 2022-01-13 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0004

T. Merricks

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章为以下问题的每一个好答案都意味着在数字上与以下问题相同的说法进行了辩护：为什么问题：在未来的某个时刻，与一个（有意识的）人的关系是什么，这解释了为什么这个人会（在那个时候）拥有对你来说重要的生存东西？因此，本章为个人身份对生存至关重要的主张辩护。本章还表明，德里克·帕菲特著名的相反论点是失败的。但Parfit的论点没有任何一种方式会毫无争议地出错。相反，这种争论失败的方式取决于这种或那种有争议的坚持形而上学。因此，在给定耐力的情况下，这一论点在某种程度上失败了，在给定（例如）阶段理论的情况下也在另一种方式上失败了。最重要的是，这种论点并不存在持久性的形而上学。

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On the Necessity of Personal Identity

This chapter defends the claim that every good answer to the following question implies being numerically identical with: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? So this chapter defends the claim that personal identity is necessary for what matters in survival. This chapter also shows that Derek Parfit’s famous argument to the contrary fails. But there is no single way in which Parfit’s argument uncontroversially goes wrong. Rather, the way in which that argument fails depends on this or that controversial metaphysics of persistence. So that argument fails in one way given endurance, and it fails in a different way given (for example) stage theory. Most importantly, there is no metaphysics of persistence on which that argument succeeds.

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来源期刊

Self and Identity PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL-

CiteScore

5.10

自引率

5.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Work on self and identity has a special place in the study of human nature, as self-concerns are arguably at the center of individuals" striving for well-being and for making sense of one"s life. Life goals develop and are influenced by one"s view of what one is like, the way one would ideally like to be (or would like to avoid being), as well as one"s perceptions of what is feasible. Furthermore, conceptions of self and the world affect how one"s progress towards these goals is monitored, evaluated, redirected, re-evaluated, and pursued again. Thus, the “self” as a construct has far-reaching implications for behavior, self-esteem, motivation, experience of emotions and the world more broadly, and hence for interpersonal relationships, society, and culture.