{"title":"《朝鲜核武装:2022年评估与2023年展望","authors":"Sung Chull Kim","doi":"10.1142/s1793930523000028","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"North Korea’s missile firings aim at proving technological advancement before deploying the weapons in the field units, as well as demonstrating a show of force to the United States and its allies. These costly firings are financed by earnings from illegal cyberactivities and arms sales. North Korea’s nuclear threat has strengthened Seoul–Washington–Tokyo cooperation and has increasingly gained public support in South Korea towards the idea of possessing their own bombs.","PeriodicalId":41995,"journal":{"name":"East Asian Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"North Korea’s Nuclear Armament: Assessment of 2022 and Outlook of 2023\",\"authors\":\"Sung Chull Kim\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/s1793930523000028\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"North Korea’s missile firings aim at proving technological advancement before deploying the weapons in the field units, as well as demonstrating a show of force to the United States and its allies. These costly firings are financed by earnings from illegal cyberactivities and arms sales. North Korea’s nuclear threat has strengthened Seoul–Washington–Tokyo cooperation and has increasingly gained public support in South Korea towards the idea of possessing their own bombs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41995,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"East Asian Policy\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"East Asian Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930523000028\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"East Asian Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930523000028","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
North Korea’s Nuclear Armament: Assessment of 2022 and Outlook of 2023
North Korea’s missile firings aim at proving technological advancement before deploying the weapons in the field units, as well as demonstrating a show of force to the United States and its allies. These costly firings are financed by earnings from illegal cyberactivities and arms sales. North Korea’s nuclear threat has strengthened Seoul–Washington–Tokyo cooperation and has increasingly gained public support in South Korea towards the idea of possessing their own bombs.