有时我是虚构的：叙事与认同

IF 0.5 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI:10.1080/05568641.2022.2103021

Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要大多数分析哲学家认为，我们不能从字面意义上认同虚构人物。具体来说，Carroll和Gaut认为这样做意味着高度的非理性。在这篇论文中，我支持这样一种说法，即由于暂停了怀疑，我们可以认同虚构人物。首先，我依靠个人身份的叙事理论，提出了一个识别过程如何在现实生活中发生的模型。然后，我解释了如何调整这个模型，以解释在认同虚构人物的特殊情况下出现的怀疑暂停。

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Sometimes I Am Fictional: Narrative and Identification

Abstract Most analytical philosophers consider that we cannot identify with fictional characters in a literal sense. Specifically, Carroll and Gaut argue that doing so would imply a high degree of irrationality. In this paper I stand for the claim that we can identify with fictional characters thanks to a suspension of disbelief. First, I rely on narrative theories of personal identity to propose a model of how the process of identification might happen in real life. Then, I explain how this model can be adapted to account for the suspension of disbelief that occurs in the special case of identification with fictional characters.

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来源期刊

Philosophical Papers PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.