具有相互依存价值的最优双边贸易

SSRN Pub Date : 2021-10-26 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3950363

Teemu Pekkarinen

{"title":"具有相互依存价值的最优双边贸易","authors":"Teemu Pekkarinen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3950363","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We derive the seller's utility maximizing selling mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Due to the interdependencies in valuations, finding the optimal mechanism is an informed seller problem. It turns out that the optimal selling procedure is no longer a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the buyer's valuation of the object is even a slightly positively dependent on the seller's type.","PeriodicalId":74863,"journal":{"name":"SSRN","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values\",\"authors\":\"Teemu Pekkarinen\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3950363\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We derive the seller's utility maximizing selling mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Due to the interdependencies in valuations, finding the optimal mechanism is an informed seller problem. It turns out that the optimal selling procedure is no longer a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the buyer's valuation of the object is even a slightly positively dependent on the seller's type.\",\"PeriodicalId\":74863,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"SSRN\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"SSRN\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950363\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SSRN","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950363","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

我们推导了双边贸易中具有相互依存价值的卖方效用最大化销售机制。由于估价的相互依赖性，找到最佳机制是一个知情的卖方问题。事实证明，如果买家对物品的估价与卖家的类型略有正相关，那么最佳销售程序就不再是接受或放弃要约。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Optimal Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values

We derive the seller's utility maximizing selling mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Due to the interdependencies in valuations, finding the optimal mechanism is an informed seller problem. It turns out that the optimal selling procedure is no longer a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the buyer's valuation of the object is even a slightly positively dependent on the seller's type.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

SSRN

自引率

0.00%

发文量