美国移民微型联邦制

IF 0.3 Q4 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Tuan N. Samahon
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在美国,移民权被认为是联邦政府的权力,但各州及其地方政府在填补国会移民政策空白方面发挥着关键作用。当面临重大移民危机时,这些多层次联邦体系中的微型联邦管辖区对政策缺口的反应各不相同。对微观联邦政策的健康容忍促进了这种实验和选民偏好最大化。在其他价值观中,对统一性的反补贴性兴趣,通过表明时间或其他限制可能是合理的,缓和了微观联邦主义的情况。各州和地方已经试验了涉及移民和融合政策的关于移民的微型联邦政策。限制主义司法管辖区推行了阻碍移民和融合的政策。他们的策略包括:在政策取向上实行限制主义时,与联邦移民执法部门进行正式合作;采取独立的州法律措施以补充联邦移民执法;以及试图迫使或重新调整联邦行政执法在移民和融合方面的优先事项的诉讼。庇护管辖区采取相反的策略。他们可能会拒绝参加自愿的联邦项目;拒绝获取可用的联邦移民身份信息;拒绝联邦政府要求配合联邦拘留请求;向所有来客提供获得国家和地方服务的机会,不论其法律地位如何;而且,像限制主义司法管辖区一样,诉讼试图迫使或重新调整联邦政府的执法重点,以支持移民和融合。联邦政府和州政府之间的冲突不可避免地会导致诉讼。联邦政府试图在涉及外国人监管的问题上维护其首要地位。在特朗普执政期间,这种努力包括可能违宪的13768号行政命令,以及针对庇护管辖区的积极联邦优先诉讼的威胁。《移民和国籍法》的条款可能会为特朗普提供一个依据,让他辩称联邦法律明确或暗示地优先于与之冲突的州法律。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
American Immigration Microfederalism
Immigration power is thought to be a federal power in the United States, but the States and their localities play key roles in filling congressional immigration policy gaps. When confronted with a major migration crisis, these microfederal jurisdictions in a multi-layered federal system respond differently to the policy gaps. A healthy tolerance for microfederal policies promotes this experimentation and voter preference maximisation. A countervailing interest in uniformity, among other values, tempers the case for microfederalism by suggesting temporal or other limitations may be justified. States and localities have experimented with microfederal policies concerning migrants that touch on migration and integration policy. Restrictionist jurisdictions have promoted policies that discourage migration and integration. Their strategies include: formal cooperation with federal immigration enforcement when restrictionist in policy orientation; adoption of independent state-law measures to supplement federal immigration enforcement; and litigation to attempt to force or realign federal executive enforcement priorities on migration and integration. Sanctuary jurisdictions adopt inverse strategies. They may decline to participate in voluntary federal programs; refuse to access available federal immigration status information; deny federal requests to cooperate with federal detainer requests; provide access to State and local services to all comers, without regard to legal status; and, like restrictionist jurisdictions, litigate to attempt to force or realign the federal government’s enforcement priorities to favour migration and integration. Inevitably, conflict between federal and state administration results in litigation. The federal government attempts to assert its primacy in those matters touching on alien regulation. During the Trump administration, this effort has included the likely unconstitutional Executive Order 13768, but also the threat of affirmative federal pre-emption litigation against sanctuary jurisdictions. Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act may provide Trump with a basis for arguing that federal law expressly or impliedly pre-oempts conflicting state law.
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CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
12
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