{"title":"英国的低调政策及其在阿以冲突中的失败(1964-1967)","authors":"Moshe Gat","doi":"10.1080/21520844.2021.1909377","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Following the Suez Campaign in October 1956, Great Britain began to step away from the Middle East. Its policy aimed at a gradual withdrawal from the region while protecting its interests, ensuring the uninterrupted supply of oil, and curbing Soviet expansion. Hence the policy of the United Kingdom (UK) was to maintain stability as another war between Israel and its Arab neighbors would be detrimental to its economy and provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to deepen its incursion into the region. Britain therefore adopted a low-profile policy, designed to avoid taking sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In practice, it was burying its head in the sand. The Arabs viewed the absence of clear support for them, particularly in the issue of water, as implicit support for Israel, especially since Britain was secretly supplying the latter with weapons. London’s low-profile policy did not stand the test of regional developments. The tension between Israel and Egypt that emerged in mid-May 1967, intensified over the closing of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, led the UK to take steps to ensure free passage through them.","PeriodicalId":37893,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Middle East and Africa","volume":"12 1","pages":"157 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21520844.2021.1909377","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The British Low-Profile Policy and Its Failure in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1964–1967\",\"authors\":\"Moshe Gat\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/21520844.2021.1909377\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT Following the Suez Campaign in October 1956, Great Britain began to step away from the Middle East. Its policy aimed at a gradual withdrawal from the region while protecting its interests, ensuring the uninterrupted supply of oil, and curbing Soviet expansion. Hence the policy of the United Kingdom (UK) was to maintain stability as another war between Israel and its Arab neighbors would be detrimental to its economy and provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to deepen its incursion into the region. Britain therefore adopted a low-profile policy, designed to avoid taking sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In practice, it was burying its head in the sand. The Arabs viewed the absence of clear support for them, particularly in the issue of water, as implicit support for Israel, especially since Britain was secretly supplying the latter with weapons. London’s low-profile policy did not stand the test of regional developments. The tension between Israel and Egypt that emerged in mid-May 1967, intensified over the closing of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, led the UK to take steps to ensure free passage through them.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37893,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the Middle East and Africa\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"157 - 180\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21520844.2021.1909377\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the Middle East and Africa\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2021.1909377\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the Middle East and Africa","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2021.1909377","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
The British Low-Profile Policy and Its Failure in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1964–1967
ABSTRACT Following the Suez Campaign in October 1956, Great Britain began to step away from the Middle East. Its policy aimed at a gradual withdrawal from the region while protecting its interests, ensuring the uninterrupted supply of oil, and curbing Soviet expansion. Hence the policy of the United Kingdom (UK) was to maintain stability as another war between Israel and its Arab neighbors would be detrimental to its economy and provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to deepen its incursion into the region. Britain therefore adopted a low-profile policy, designed to avoid taking sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In practice, it was burying its head in the sand. The Arabs viewed the absence of clear support for them, particularly in the issue of water, as implicit support for Israel, especially since Britain was secretly supplying the latter with weapons. London’s low-profile policy did not stand the test of regional developments. The tension between Israel and Egypt that emerged in mid-May 1967, intensified over the closing of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, led the UK to take steps to ensure free passage through them.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, the flagship publication of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), is the first peer-reviewed academic journal to include both the entire continent of Africa and the Middle East within its purview—exploring the historic social, economic, and political links between these two regions, as well as the modern challenges they face. Interdisciplinary in its nature, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa approaches the regions from the perspectives of Middle Eastern and African studies as well as anthropology, economics, history, international law, political science, religion, security studies, women''s studies, and other disciplines of the social sciences and humanities. It seeks to promote new research to understand better the past and chart more clearly the future of scholarship on the regions. The histories, cultures, and peoples of the Middle East and Africa long have shared important commonalities. The traces of these linkages in current events as well as contemporary scholarly and popular discourse reminds us of how these two geopolitical spaces historically have been—and remain—very much connected to each other and central to world history. Now more than ever, there is an acute need for quality scholarship and a deeper understanding of the Middle East and Africa, both historically and as contemporary realities. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa seeks to provide such understanding and stimulate further intellectual debate about them for the betterment of all.