为什么添加真理是不够的:对米兹拉希关于“进步是真理的近似值”的回答

IF 0.7 2区哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-04-03 DOI:10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502

G. Cevolani, Luca Tambolo

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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要在本杂志最近发表的一篇题为《科学进步：为什么仅仅接近真相是不够的》（2017）的论文中，Moti Mizrahi认为，将进步视为接近真相或增加真实性的观点显然是错误的。他的论点的关键前提是，在这种进步观下，为了更接近真理，人们只需要在假设或理论中任意添加一个真正的析取。由于很明显，科学进步不是在理论中添加真正的脱节，有人认为，将进步视为接近真理的观点是站不住脚的。我们表明，米兹拉希论点的关键前提是错误的：根据对进展的基于逼真性的描述，在现有理论中添加任意的真析取是不足以接近真相的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Why Adding Truths Is Not Enough: A Reply to Mizrahi on Progress as Approximation to the Truth

ABSTRACT In a recent paper in this journal, entitled ‘Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough’ (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi’s argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.

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来源期刊

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.