{"title":"1916-1917年德国新防御战术的介绍","authors":"Tony Cowan","doi":"10.25602/GOLD.BJMH.V5I2.1314","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Responding to the crisis posed by the battle of the Somme, in late 1916 the German army introduced new defensive tactics. It has been suggested that formal, top-down doctrine was a less important driver of this change than the bottom-up system of after-action reports, and that once initial resistance was overcome the new tactics were successfully adopted throughout the army. This article draws on little-studied archival material to reveal how doctrine evolved by stages in a complex combination of action, after-action reports, personalities and the high command’s desire to impose greater top-down control. Throughout this period, doctrine remained key to tactical change, but its implementation was patchier than the German army’s reputation suggests.","PeriodicalId":92181,"journal":{"name":"British journal for military history","volume":"5 1","pages":"81-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Introduction of New German Defensive Tactics in 1916-1917\",\"authors\":\"Tony Cowan\",\"doi\":\"10.25602/GOLD.BJMH.V5I2.1314\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Responding to the crisis posed by the battle of the Somme, in late 1916 the German army introduced new defensive tactics. It has been suggested that formal, top-down doctrine was a less important driver of this change than the bottom-up system of after-action reports, and that once initial resistance was overcome the new tactics were successfully adopted throughout the army. This article draws on little-studied archival material to reveal how doctrine evolved by stages in a complex combination of action, after-action reports, personalities and the high command’s desire to impose greater top-down control. Throughout this period, doctrine remained key to tactical change, but its implementation was patchier than the German army’s reputation suggests.\",\"PeriodicalId\":92181,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"British journal for military history\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"81-99\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"British journal for military history\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.25602/GOLD.BJMH.V5I2.1314\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"British journal for military history","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25602/GOLD.BJMH.V5I2.1314","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Introduction of New German Defensive Tactics in 1916-1917
Responding to the crisis posed by the battle of the Somme, in late 1916 the German army introduced new defensive tactics. It has been suggested that formal, top-down doctrine was a less important driver of this change than the bottom-up system of after-action reports, and that once initial resistance was overcome the new tactics were successfully adopted throughout the army. This article draws on little-studied archival material to reveal how doctrine evolved by stages in a complex combination of action, after-action reports, personalities and the high command’s desire to impose greater top-down control. Throughout this period, doctrine remained key to tactical change, but its implementation was patchier than the German army’s reputation suggests.