A Modal Contextualist Account of Essentialist Claims as a Response to Kit Fine

Abstract Kit Fine advanced a remarkable objection to the Modal Account of Essentialism. Fine’s concern is commonly thought to have put the modal account in serious jeopardy. I believe that Fine’s objection is mainly based on two intuitions. As a reaction to Fine’s argument, while many scholars have abandoned the modal account, others have attempted to save it. The main strategy in the last direction consists in adding to the modal criterion a condition that is supposed to hold universally. For different reasons, this strategy ends up rejecting part of the first Fine’s intuition. I believe that a modal contextualist approach to essentialist claims, through the addition of a ‘particularist’ condition to the modal criterion, can provide an interesting alternative for those who wish to maintain a modal approach to essentialism. I will show that this approach, while rejecting the second Finean intuition, is able to account for his first intuition.