On the chances of structural pluralism in the liberal theory of property

Hanoch Dagan is an admirable thinker and a particularly persuasive writer: in fact, only a person with a heart of stone would fail to love his liberalism. Yet, that should also give rise to doubt – how is it possible that many critics of both property and autonomy can so easily line up behind Dagan’s story? Is it really the case that if only we properly incorporate the criticisms of private property, we can end up with an institution of liberal property that works for all? Where commons co-exist with private property, and markets co-exist with other forms of economic provisioning, all on an equal footing, in a state of perfect equilibrium? In this contribution, I do not intend to critique Dagan on the basis that his normative theory is impervious to the harsh realities of contemporary capitalism. That point has been made. Rather, I would like to argue that Dagan’s account does not work even on its own terms. That is, his structural pluralism – a condition for the legitimacy of private property – cannot really exist within his individualist framework. The criticism that I will raise here is a version of the criticism that Dagan himself mounts against the feasibility of Nozick’s utopia: