竞争法与自由贸易协定在国有企业规制中的相互作用

IF 1.5 Q1 LAW
M. Matsushita
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引用次数: 3

摘要

摘要国有企业是政府所有的商业实体。与以盈利为动机的私营企业不同,国有企业往往以不同于盈利的动机行事,例如实现政府或政治目的。由于这种特殊性,国有企业的经营活动有时会破坏竞争市场。为了规范国有企业的活动,使国际市场不会受到不适当的干扰,关贸总协定第十七条规定,国有企业在国际贸易中应以营利为动机。最近,CPTPP(跨太平洋伙伴关系全面与进步协定)和其他自由贸易协定包括专门针对国有企业监管的章节,规定缔约方确保其国有企业基于利润动机行事,以免对国际市场造成干扰。另一方面,贸易国的竞争法规定了禁止占主导地位的企业滥用权力的规则,其中包括禁止国有企业滥用权力。然而,这两套法规(一方面是关贸总协定和CPTPP,另一方面是竞争法)的适用是相互独立的,没有经过协调。本文调查了CPTPP下国有企业监管的细节,作为自由贸易协定监管和各国竞争法的代表性例子,并提出了协调这两套规则的方法,以提高对国有企业活动的法律纪律的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Interplay of Competition Law and Free Trade Agreements in Regulating State-Owned Enterprises
Abstract State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) are business entities owned by governments. Unlike private enterprises which operate on profit-motivation, SOEs often act on motives different from profit-making such as fulfilment of governmental or political purposes. Due to this peculiar feature, activities of SOEs sometime are disruptive of competitive market. In order to regulate activities of SOEs so that international market would not be unduly disturbed, GATT: Article XVII states that SOEs shall operate on a profit-motive in international trade. More recently, CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership) and other FTAs include chapters devoted to the regulation of SOEs which provide that Contracting Parties ensure that their SOEs act on profit-motive so as not to cause disruption to the international market. On the other hand, competition laws of trading nations provide rules for prohibiting abusive conducts of dominant enterprises and this includes the prohibition of abuses by SOEs. However, applications of those two sets of regulations (GATT and CPTPP on one hand and competition laws on the other) are made independently from each other without being coordinated. This article surveys details of regulation of SOEs under CPTPP as a representative example of FTAs regulation and of competition laws of nations and suggests ways in which those two sets of rules can be coordinated in order to increase the effectiveness of legal disciplines imposed on SOEs’ activities.
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来源期刊
German Law Journal
German Law Journal Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
7.70%
发文量
75
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