{"title":"从梅农店看","authors":"Maciej Sendłak","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.028","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n\n\nIn this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.\n\n\n","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"From the Meinongian Point of View\",\"authors\":\"Maciej Sendłak\",\"doi\":\"10.12775/llp.2022.028\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n\\n\\nIn this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.\\n\\n\\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":43501,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Logic and Logical Philosophy\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Logic and Logical Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.028\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LOGIC\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.028","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LOGIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.
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