知识的还原观与小差异原则

IF 1.7 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI:10.1017/can.2023.16

Simon Wimmer

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:我提出了一个挑战，以了解$ \phi $的简化观点，这吸引了我所谓的可分级性质。这种吸引力允许本质上非常类似于知道$ \phi $的性质，但在它们的规范意义上有很大不同。这违反了Pautz(2017)称为“小差异原则”的独立可信的主张。

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Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle

Abstract I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that $ \phi $ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that $ \phi $ , but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’

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来源期刊

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

11.10%

发文量