基于新区块结构的Unlink攻击防御方法

Yuan-Zhi Huo, Gang Wang, Fachang Yang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

Unlink攻击是在Linux平台下攻击堆溢出漏洞的一种方式。然而,由于堆溢出数据很少直接导致程序控制流劫持和相关保护机制的限制,现有的检测技术很难判断程序是否满足堆溢出攻击条件。在现有的取消链接机制中有一些检查措施,但通过仔细构建堆的内容,可以绕过检查措施。取消链接机制必须由自由函数触发,这一原理类似于堆栈的函数退出。本文通过栈中的金丝雀保护机制获得启示,将其添加到块结构中,对金丝雀值进行加密,并从基本结构上防御unlink攻击。实验结果表明,该方法可以有效地防止unlink攻击的发生,并具有检测常见堆溢出的能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Unlink Attack Defense Method Based on New Chunk Structure
The Unlink attack is a way of attacking the heap overflow vulnerability under the Linux platform. However, because the heap overflow data seldom directly leads to program control flow hijacking and related protection mechanism limitations, the existing detection technology is difficult to judge whether the program meets the heap overflow attack condition. There are certain inspection measures in the existing unlink mechanism, but with carefully constructing the contents of the heap, you can bypass the inspection measures. The unlink mechanism must be triggered with the free function, and this principle is similar to function-exit of stacks. The paper obtains the inspiration through the canary protection mechanism in the stack, adds it to the chunk structure, encrypts the canary value, and defends the unlink attack from the fundamental structure. The experimental results show that this method can effectively prevent the occurrence of unlink attacks and has the ability to detect common heap overflows.
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