我的还是我们的?独裁者游戏中的意外框架效应

IF 1.3 4区社会学 Q3 SOCIOLOGY

Rationality and Society Pub Date : 2022-01-11 DOI:10.1177/10434631211073326

Andreas Bergh, P. Wichardt

{"title":"我的还是我们的?独裁者游戏中的意外框架效应","authors":"Andreas Bergh, P. Wichardt","doi":"10.1177/10434631211073326","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35% vs. 52%). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"78 - 95"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games\",\"authors\":\"Andreas Bergh, P. Wichardt\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/10434631211073326\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35% vs. 52%). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63\",\"PeriodicalId\":47079,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Rationality and Society\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"78 - 95\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Rationality and Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211073326\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"SOCIOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Rationality and Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211073326","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"SOCIOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文报告了一个课堂独裁者游戏的结果，比较了三组不同标准指令的效果。结果表明，标准指令中看似微小且通常未报告的差异会引发对待分配资金的权利和所有权的不同看法，这些看法会影响行为。当任务被描述为慷慨的任务时，给出的更少，而当任务是分配的任务时（平均35%对52%），给出的更多。研究结果有助于解释文献中报道的独裁者游戏给出的巨大差异，并表明即使是指令上的微小和未报告的差异也会改变游戏的感知方式。JEL代码：C70；C91；D63

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35% vs. 52%). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Rationality and Society SOCIOLOGY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Rationality & Society focuses on the growing contributions of rational-action based theory, and the questions and controversies surrounding this growth. Why Choose Rationality and Society? The trend toward ever-greater specialization in many areas of intellectual life has lead to fragmentation that deprives scholars of the ability to communicate even in closely adjoining fields. The emergence of the rational action paradigm as the inter-lingua of the social sciences is a remarkable exception to this trend. It is the one paradigm that offers the promise of bringing greater theoretical unity across disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, cognitive psychology, moral philosophy and law.