为什么逻辑不只是它的有效推论集

IF 0.5 0 PHILOSOPHY

Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2021-11-01 DOI:10.36446/af.2021.461

E. Barrio, F. Pailos

{"title":"为什么逻辑不只是它的有效推论集","authors":"E. Barrio, F. Pailos","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.461","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences\",\"authors\":\"E. Barrio, F. Pailos\",\"doi\":\"10.36446/af.2021.461\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.\",\"PeriodicalId\":40940,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analisis Filosofico\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analisis Filosofico\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.461\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analisis Filosofico","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.461","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

我们在本文中要捍卫的主要观点是，当结构属性进入游戏时，逻辑是什么的问题应该以不同的方式解决。特别是，我们希望支持这样一种观点，即仅仅识别一组有效的推论来表征逻辑是不够的。换句话说，我们将争辩说，两个逻辑理论可以识别同一组有效性（例如其逻辑真理和有效推论），但不是同一逻辑。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Why a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences

The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Analisis Filosofico PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

15 weeks

期刊介绍： Análisis Filosófico is an open access scientific journal issued by the Argentine Society of Philosophical Analysis (SADAF). Since 1981, it offers original and unpublished papers on theoretical and practical philosophy, discussions, critical studies and reviews –in Spanish, English and Portuguese– that contribute to the development of philosophical analysis. Essential conditions for publication are conceptual accuracy, precision and novelty. Its refereeing policy is based on double-blind reviews and external assessment. It is launched twice a year on May and November.