{"title":"对两种数字签名方案的代数和量子攻击","authors":"V. Roman’kov, A. Ushakov, V. Shpilrain","doi":"10.1515/jmc-2022-0023","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, we analyze two digital signature schemes, proposed in Moldovyan et al., that use finite noncommutative associative algebras as underlying platforms. We prove that these schemes do not possess the claimed property of being quantum safe. We also show that in many cases these schemes are, in fact, vulnerable to “classical” algebraic cryptanalysis.","PeriodicalId":43866,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Cryptology","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Algebraic and quantum attacks on two digital signature schemes\",\"authors\":\"V. Roman’kov, A. Ushakov, V. Shpilrain\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/jmc-2022-0023\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract In this article, we analyze two digital signature schemes, proposed in Moldovyan et al., that use finite noncommutative associative algebras as underlying platforms. We prove that these schemes do not possess the claimed property of being quantum safe. We also show that in many cases these schemes are, in fact, vulnerable to “classical” algebraic cryptanalysis.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43866,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Mathematical Cryptology\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Mathematical Cryptology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2022-0023\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mathematical Cryptology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2022-0023","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Algebraic and quantum attacks on two digital signature schemes
Abstract In this article, we analyze two digital signature schemes, proposed in Moldovyan et al., that use finite noncommutative associative algebras as underlying platforms. We prove that these schemes do not possess the claimed property of being quantum safe. We also show that in many cases these schemes are, in fact, vulnerable to “classical” algebraic cryptanalysis.