跟随追随者:当经理人跟随分析师报道时的共同基金表现

Q4 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Gerald Abdesaken
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据分析师覆盖范围和共识建议调整投资组合的共同基金经理取得了显著成就。可能会降低风险调整后的回报率,但比单独考虑共识建议时表现更好。在理性预期均衡设置中,考虑到风险资产的分析师覆盖率增加,不熟练的投资者更重视风险资产的公开信号。一种基于分析师覆盖率的管理技能的新措施被制定,并显示在共同基金alpha中正在减少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Following the Followers: Mutual Fund Performance When Managers Follow Analyst Coverage
Mutual fund managers who adjust portfolio holdings based on analyst coverage and consensus recommendations achieve signi?cantly lower risk-adjusted returns, but perform better than when consensus recommendations are considered alone. In a rational expectations equilibrium setup, an unskilled investor places greater weight on a risky asset’s public signal, given an increase in the asset’s analyst coverage. A new measure of managerial skill based on analyst coverage is formulated and shown to be decreasing in mutual fund alphas.
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来源期刊
Journal of Index Investing
Journal of Index Investing Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Finance
CiteScore
0.70
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