理由作为偏好的理由

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
R. Rowland
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我认为,行为和态度的所有原因都包含在偏好的原因中;称此视图为RP。根据RP, A相信p的原因在于A倾向于相信p而不是不相信p的原因,而A倾向于采取赞成态度或采取行动的原因在于A倾向于采取那种态度/采取那种行动的原因。我认为我们有充分的理由接受RP,因为只有当我们接受RP时,我们才能解释偏好原因和其他原因之间的相关性。我认为,没有反对意见会破坏RP, RP有有趣的含义,因为存在的态度和原教旨主义的原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reasons as Reasons for Preferences
I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for preferences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.
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