韩国导弹部队与三角战略稳定的出现

Q2 Social Sciences
Joshua H. Pollack, Minji Kim
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要:韩国持续追求常规精确打击能力和更大的军事决策自主权,正在重塑其核武器盟友美国和核武器对手朝鲜之间的战略稳定动态。在过去的十年里,朝韩两国在常规精确打击导弹方面的进展伴随着先发制人和攻击领导人的相互威胁,为危机升级为战争开辟了新的途径。考虑到美国对韩国的安全保障,以及朝鲜发展核武库以威慑美国,朝鲜的任何大规模武装冲突都可能涉及使用核武器。应该扩大联盟对扩大威慑质量的传统关注,以反映对这种三角稳定动态的理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
South Korea’s missile forces and the emergence of triangular strategic (in)stability
ABSTRACT South Korea’s sustained pursuit of conventional precision-strike capabilities and greater autonomy in military decision making is reshaping strategic-stability dynamics between its nuclear-armed ally, the United States, and its nuclear-armed adversary, North Korea. For the last decade, advances in conventional, precision-strike missiles in both Koreas have accompanied reciprocal threats of pre-emption and attacks on leaders, creating a new pathway for a crisis to escalate into a war. Given US security guarantees to South Korea, and North Korea’s development of a nuclear arsenal to deter the United States, any large-scale armed conflict in Korea is liable to involve the use of nuclear weapons. The traditional concern of the alliance with the quality of extended deterrence should be broadened to reflect an understanding of this triangular stability dynamic.
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来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
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