拟议的欧盟数字市场法案:欧洲数字经济的新时代

IF 0.5 Q3 LAW
Penelope A. Bergkamp
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文中的分析表明,《数字市场法》(DMA)将改变数字经济的游戏规则。从法律角度来看,DMA应被视为一种针对特定行业的“事前”监管,即与依赖“事后”执行的欧盟一般竞争法相关的“特别法”。DMA限制了“大型科技公司”的自利行为,并赋予较小的竞争对手积极的竞争权利,即使根据欧盟一般竞争法,大型科技公司不存在反竞争行为。根据其条款,DMA旨在确保“有竞争力和公平的数字市场”,而不考虑消费者福利。为了实现这一目标,它将对大型科技公司施加通用义务,这些义务类似于委员会以前在具体反垄断执法措施中使用的补救措施,或者解决委员会目前正在调查的反垄断投诉。与传统的欧盟竞争法不同,尽管DMA有明确的目的,但其主要作用不是保护欧洲互联网用户(尽管他们可能间接受益),而是保护较小的欧洲竞争对手免受美国“大科技”的侵害。这些规模较小的竞争对手将不再需要求助于目前针对滥用垄断权力的事后执法系统,据信该系统不足以应对数字垄断权力。反垄断程序需要很长时间(五年或五年以上也不例外),同时竞争危害可能会增加。在许多情况下,DMA会使依赖这种缓慢的事后执行计划变得没有必要。相反,它将使“事前”执法行动能够确保市场在巨额罚款的威胁下具有竞争力。由于其影响深远的条款,DMA可能需要改变大型科技公司的商业模式。DMA重申了亚当·斯密的名言“我们期待我们的晚餐不是出于屠夫、酿酒师或面包师的仁慈,而是出于他们对自己利益的考虑”。对于数字经济,这句话将被改写为:“我们期待我们的晚餐不是出于对看门人自身利益的尊重,而是出于他们的仁慈”。强制性的“大科技慈善”很可能有利于“商业用户”,即使用平台向互联网用户提供商品或服务的人或公司。然而,DMA引发的大型科技公司商业模式的变化也可能影响免费互联网服务。无论如何,DMA将在数字经济运营中引发重大变化和摩擦,这可能导致频繁的纠纷和执法行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Proposed EU Digital Markets Act: A New Era for the Digital Economy in Europe
The analysis presented in this article suggests that the Digital Markets Act (DMA) would be a game-changer for the digital economy. From a legal perspective, the DMA should be regarded as a sector-specific, ‘ex ante’ regulation, i.e., a ‘lex specialis’ in relation to the general EU competition law, which relies on ‘ex post’ enforcement. The DMA restricts self-interested behaviour by ‘big tech’ and grants smaller competitors affirmative competitive rights, even where there is no anticompetitive behaviour by big tech under general EU competition law. By its terms, the DMA is aimed at ensuring ‘contestable and fair digital markets’, irrespective of consumer welfare. To achieve this objective, it will impose generic obligations on big tech that resemble remedies previously employed by the Commission in specific antitrust enforcement measures or that address antitrust complaints that the Commission is currently investigating. Unlike conventional EU competition law, despite the DMA’s stated purpose, its main effect is not protection of European internet users (although they may benefit indirectly), but the protection of smaller European competitors against US ‘big tech’. These smaller competitors would no longer need to resort to the current system of ex post enforcement against abuse of monopoly power, which is believed to be insufficiently equipped to deal with digital monopoly power. Antitrust proceedings take a long time (five years or more is no exception), and in the meantime the competitive harm can increase. In many cases, the DMAwould make reliance on this slow, ex post enforcement program unnecessary. Instead, it would enable ‘ex ante’ enforcement actions to ensure competitive markets under the threat of very large fines. Due to its far-reaching terms, the DMA would likely require changes to the business models of big tech. The DMA restates Adam Smith’s famous quip ‘[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest’. For the digital economy, the saying would be rewritten as: ‘It is not from the regard for their own interest of the gatekeepers that we expect our dinner, but from their benevolence’. Mandatory ‘big tech benevolence’ may well benefit ‘business users’, i.e., people or companies that use platforms to provide goods or services to internet users. Changes in big tech’s business models prompted by the DMA, however, might also affect free internet services. In any event, the DMAwould give rise to significant changes and friction in the operation of the digital economy, which may result in frequent disputes and enforcement actions.
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