论波函数实在论的方法论论证

IF 0.7 2区哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-04-03 DOI:10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786

V. Matarese

{"title":"论波函数实在论的方法论论证","authors":"V. Matarese","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On The Methodological Arguments for Wave−Function Realism\",\"authors\":\"V. Matarese\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44433,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文探讨了反对波函数实在论的一条特殊路线。这一观点由Bell（1987）倡导，目前由Albert（1996）、North（2013）和Ney（2016）辩护，声称量子波函数是一个高维物理场。通常，波函数实在论因其本体论承诺而受到批评，这些承诺在原则上被认为是经验上不可支持的，并且违反了经验连贯性。在这篇论文中，我调查了是否有任何方法论论据支持这样的本体论，以及它们是否合理。特别是，我集中讨论了三个可以用来支持波函数实在论的论点：（I）来自法律的论点；（ii）来自系统完整信息的论点；（iii）来自解释的论点。我的结论是，这些论点并没有为从量子理论推断高维物理场的存在提供任何良好的方法学依据。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

On The Methodological Arguments for Wave−Function Realism

ABSTRACT The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.