The Phenomenological Function of Humor

In this paper, I seek to explore the increasing popular claim that the performance of philosophy and the performance of humor share similar features. I argue that the explanation lies in the function of humor—a function which can be a catalyst for philosophy. Following Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and utilizing insights from various philosophical and scientific perspectives on the nature and origins of humor, I argue that the function of humor is to reveal faulty belief or error in judgment. Once such errors are revealed the mind demands resolution, and this is the work of philosophy. But philosophy cannot solve a problem unless it recognizes that there is a problem to solve. That is, the move from ignorance to philosophy requires a mediating step. Humor can act as that step, and, as such, humor can serve as a catalyst for philosophy while being necessarily distinct from it. An emerging theme in contemporary cultural studies is the exploration of connections between humor and philosophy. John Morreall, for example, asserts that “most of [humor’s] benefits [self-transcendence, humility, critical and creative thinking, etc.] are benefits of philosophy too” while comedy instructor Greg Dean explains that the reason for a comic to be on stage is “to tell the audience what’s wrong,” something that many philosophers believe is the first step in reflective awareness of oneself or the world. Recently, when I argued that humor is best understood metaphysically as what Ernst Cassirer would call a “symbolic form,” Cassirer scholar Stephen Lofts commented that perhaps humor and philosophy serve similar functions in Cassirer’s system. In this paper, I seek to explore why the performance of philosophy and the performance of humor share similar features. I argue that the explanation lies in the function of humor—a function which can be a catalyst for philosophy. Following Cassirer’s metaphysical philosophy of symbolic forms and utilizing insights from philosophical, phenomenological, psychological, and bio-evolutionary perspectives on the nature and origins of humor, I claim that the function of humor is to reveal faulty belief or error in judgment. Once such errors are revealed the human mind demands resolution, as anomalies are inherently disturbing. This resolution is the work of philosophy. But philosophy cannot begin to solve a problem unless it recognizes that there is a problem to solve. In other words, the move from ignorance to philosophy requires a mediating step. Humor can act as that step, and as such humor can serve as a catalyst for philosophy while being necessarily distinct from it. My argument will make use of Cassirer’s understanding of symbolic forms and the role of philosophy within his system. I assume this definition of philosophy and its function for two reasons: first, I believe that his definition can subsume most contemporary understandings of philosophy as a discipline, albeit in the language of phenomenology. Second, I have previously argued that humor is best understood in Cassirer’s terms as a symbolic form. If I am correct about this metaphysical status of humor, then humor must serve its own unique function separate from all other forms and from philosophy lest it simply collapse into one of them. Therefore, identifying the unique function of humor adds further support for my claim that it is, indeed, a symbolic form. It is thus fruitful to maintain the same metaphysic and language in this argument. In sum, I will argue the following: (1) that humor and philosophy serve distinct and irreducible functions, though (2) humor can indeed be a path to philosophy. This argument (3) further supports my claim that humor is a symbolic form. 1. Contemporary Theories of Humor a. Philosophical Theories The subfield which we now call the philosophy of humor began with Plato, who, in addition to Hobbes and Kant, wrote about laughter. Aristotle wrote about the virtue of wit and the vice of buffoonery, while Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard wrote about absurdity. It was not until distinctions were made between humor, as a broad category, and those things which may fall under it (laughter, wit, etc.), that a more critical philosophy of humor took shape. It is agreed that humor is an umbrella term which is meant to encompass everything that can be considered humorous stimuli, whether it be verbal or nonverbal, satire or wit, genre or pun. Humor may include those things that make us laugh but is not limited only to those things. Laughter is a physiological action which may or may not be stimulated by humor; this is clear when we think of nervous or contact laughter. While laughter can accompany humor, neither depends on the other. These distinctions are crucially important, as Morreall insists, because “without them we are in danger of conflating different types of laughter situations . . . the most common mistake here is to treat all cases of laughter as cases of humor.” This distinction understood, many classic theories were recategorized as theories of laughter, and contemporary philosophers set about understanding how these insights informed our understanding of humor itself. What follows IDEALISTIC STUDIES