从收购法视角看英国与中国互联资本市场的监管协调前景

IF 0.5 Q3 LAW
Joseph Lee, Yonghui Bao
{"title":"从收购法视角看英国与中国互联资本市场的监管协调前景","authors":"Joseph Lee, Yonghui Bao","doi":"10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The United Kingdom (UK) and China have launched the London–Shanghai Stock Connect Scheme to achieve an integrated capital market. In this article, the takeover market is used as an example to examine the extent to which regulatory alignment between the UK and China is possible. The focus is on the role of financial intermediaries in the two markets and how they may influence the governance model of the transfer of corporate control by an open offer to the shareholders of the target company (a takeover bid). This article argues that without regulatory alignment such an integrated market is unlikely to be realized. There are differences between the UK and China in the economic model, ownership structure, and institutional arrangements, which have been reflected in the differences in interests served by takeover law in the two regimes. The design of the framework for takeover law in the UK empowers financial market participants, so as to attract capital to the London markets. In contrast, China’s takeover law is mainly aimed at facilitating industrial restructuring and creating globally competitive national companies (national champions). Hence, the UK’s shareholder-centred takeover model, with a strong focus on financial intermediaries and international investors, would not be easily replicated in China. However, the UK model could provide lessons for China to develop its takeover market—that is, further its market structure reform, develop independent financial intermediaries, and also attract an increasing number of investors.","PeriodicalId":42366,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"8 1","pages":"450-484"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Prospect of Regulatory Alignment for an Interconnected Capital Market between the United Kingdom and China: A Takeover Law Perspective\",\"authors\":\"Joseph Lee, Yonghui Bao\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The United Kingdom (UK) and China have launched the London–Shanghai Stock Connect Scheme to achieve an integrated capital market. In this article, the takeover market is used as an example to examine the extent to which regulatory alignment between the UK and China is possible. The focus is on the role of financial intermediaries in the two markets and how they may influence the governance model of the transfer of corporate control by an open offer to the shareholders of the target company (a takeover bid). This article argues that without regulatory alignment such an integrated market is unlikely to be realized. There are differences between the UK and China in the economic model, ownership structure, and institutional arrangements, which have been reflected in the differences in interests served by takeover law in the two regimes. The design of the framework for takeover law in the UK empowers financial market participants, so as to attract capital to the London markets. In contrast, China’s takeover law is mainly aimed at facilitating industrial restructuring and creating globally competitive national companies (national champions). Hence, the UK’s shareholder-centred takeover model, with a strong focus on financial intermediaries and international investors, would not be easily replicated in China. However, the UK model could provide lessons for China to develop its takeover market—that is, further its market structure reform, develop independent financial intermediaries, and also attract an increasing number of investors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42366,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"450-484\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

英国和中国启动了“沪伦通”机制,实现资本市场一体化。在本文中,以收购市场为例,考察英国和中国之间的监管一致性在多大程度上是可能的。重点是金融中介机构在两个市场中的作用,以及它们如何影响通过向目标公司股东公开要约(收购出价)将公司控制权转移的治理模式。本文认为,如果没有监管协调,这样一个一体化的市场是不可能实现的。中英两国在经济模式、股权结构和制度安排上存在差异,这反映在两国收购法律所服务的利益差异上。英国收购法框架的设计赋予了金融市场参与者权力,从而吸引资本进入伦敦市场。相比之下,中国的并购法主要是为了促进产业结构调整,创造具有全球竞争力的民族企业(国家冠军企业)。因此,英国以股东为中心、高度关注金融中介机构和国际投资者的收购模式,在中国不容易复制。然而,英国的模式可以为中国发展收购市场提供借鉴,即进一步改革市场结构,发展独立的金融中介机构,并吸引越来越多的投资者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Prospect of Regulatory Alignment for an Interconnected Capital Market between the United Kingdom and China: A Takeover Law Perspective
The United Kingdom (UK) and China have launched the London–Shanghai Stock Connect Scheme to achieve an integrated capital market. In this article, the takeover market is used as an example to examine the extent to which regulatory alignment between the UK and China is possible. The focus is on the role of financial intermediaries in the two markets and how they may influence the governance model of the transfer of corporate control by an open offer to the shareholders of the target company (a takeover bid). This article argues that without regulatory alignment such an integrated market is unlikely to be realized. There are differences between the UK and China in the economic model, ownership structure, and institutional arrangements, which have been reflected in the differences in interests served by takeover law in the two regimes. The design of the framework for takeover law in the UK empowers financial market participants, so as to attract capital to the London markets. In contrast, China’s takeover law is mainly aimed at facilitating industrial restructuring and creating globally competitive national companies (national champions). Hence, the UK’s shareholder-centred takeover model, with a strong focus on financial intermediaries and international investors, would not be easily replicated in China. However, the UK model could provide lessons for China to develop its takeover market—that is, further its market structure reform, develop independent financial intermediaries, and also attract an increasing number of investors.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law (CJCL) is an independent, peer-reviewed, general comparative law journal published under the auspices of the International Academy of Comparative Law (IACL) and in association with the Silk Road Institute for International and Comparative Law (SRIICL) at Xi’an Jiaotong University, PR China. CJCL aims to provide a leading international forum for comparative studies on all disciplines of law, including cross-disciplinary legal studies. It gives preference to articles addressing issues of fundamental and lasting importance in the field of comparative law.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信