{"title":"什么时候(业绩敏感型)债务是最优的?","authors":"Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, D. Gottlieb","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3895702","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Existing theories of debt consider a single contractible performance measure (\"output\"). In reality, many other performance signals are also available. It may seem that debt is no longer optimal; for example, if the signals are sufficiently positive, the agent should receive a payment even if output is low. This paper shows that debt remains the optimal contract under additional signals -- they only affect the face value of debt, but not the form of the contract. We show how the face value should depend on other signals, providing a theory of performance-sensitive debt.","PeriodicalId":7317,"journal":{"name":"Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal?\",\"authors\":\"Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, D. Gottlieb\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3895702\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Existing theories of debt consider a single contractible performance measure (\\\"output\\\"). In reality, many other performance signals are also available. It may seem that debt is no longer optimal; for example, if the signals are sufficiently positive, the agent should receive a payment even if output is low. This paper shows that debt remains the optimal contract under additional signals -- they only affect the face value of debt, but not the form of the contract. We show how the face value should depend on other signals, providing a theory of performance-sensitive debt.\",\"PeriodicalId\":7317,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Accounting\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895702\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Pharmacology, Toxicology and Pharmaceutics\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895702","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Pharmacology, Toxicology and Pharmaceutics","Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing theories of debt consider a single contractible performance measure ("output"). In reality, many other performance signals are also available. It may seem that debt is no longer optimal; for example, if the signals are sufficiently positive, the agent should receive a payment even if output is low. This paper shows that debt remains the optimal contract under additional signals -- they only affect the face value of debt, but not the form of the contract. We show how the face value should depend on other signals, providing a theory of performance-sensitive debt.