敲军营的门:角色观念如何塑造军队对政治要求的反应

IF 2.5 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
C. Harig, Chiara Ruffa
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引用次数: 7

摘要

关于军民关系的学术研究通常认为,民主和文官控制的危险主要来自军方“强行”进入政治的倾向。然而,文官控制往往是政府将军队“拉”到可能存在问题的角色中去的先决条件。这些可能包括军队参与政治争端或国内公共安全任务。尽管与实证相关,但很少有学术工作致力于理解“拉动”是如何起作用的。在本文中,我们旨在提供第一个探索性的“拉动”框架,以捕捉军方反应的动态以及对军民关系的间接后果。我们在分析中确定了拉扯发生的三个不同阶段。首先,政客们要么采取行动,要么采取政治拉扯行动。其次,我们将军方的反应置于一个范围内,从拒绝到无条件遵守。这种反应是由军方关于适当任务的角色观念及其与政治的关系所驱动的。在第三阶段,军方可能会慢慢开始转变角色观念,以适应新的角色。我们通过对两种不同拉动案例的案例研究来说明我们的论点:法国(2015-19年)的操作性拉动和巴西(2010-20年)的操作性(随后转为政治性)拉动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Knocking on the barracks’ door: How role conceptions shape the military's reactions to political demands
Abstract Academic research on civil-military relations often assumes that dangers for democracy and civilian control mainly emanate from the military's predisposition of ‘pushing’ its way into politics. Yet, civilian control frequently is a precondition for governments’ moves of ‘pulling’ the military into roles that may potentially be problematic. These can include the military's involvement in political disputes or internal public security missions. Notwithstanding its empirical relevance, little academic work has been devoted to understanding how ‘pulling’ works. In this article, we aim to provide a first, exploratory framework of ‘pulling’ that captures the dynamics of the military's reactions and indirect consequences for civil-military relations. We identify three analytically distinct phases in which pulling occurs. First, politicians initiate either operational or political pulling moves. Second, we situate the military's reaction on a spectrum that ranges from refusal to non-conditional compliance. This reaction is driven by the military's role conceptions about appropriate missions and their relation to politics. In a third phase, the military may slowly start shifting its role conceptions to adapt to its new roles. We illustrate our argument with case studies of two different instances of pulling: operational pulling in the case of France (2015–19) and operational – then-turned-political – pulling in the case of Brazil (2010–20).
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
13.60%
发文量
30
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