什么时候放弃《不扩散条约》才是合法的？退出是推动核裁军的政治工具

IF 4 1区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2021-12-02 DOI:10.1080/13523260.2021.2009695

Joelien Pretorius, Tom Sauer

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引用次数: 10

摘要

条约可以单方面或集体予以谴责和退出。我们问，放弃《不扩散条约》何时才是合法的。50年前，该条约承诺各国致力于核不扩散和核裁军，但至今仍未实现后者。《不扩散条约》的终止是军备控制界的一个禁忌话题，军备控制界将其视为核秩序的基石。我们借鉴了有关国际机构合法性和退出国际机构的文献。我们特别探讨了无核武器国家在《不扩散条约》论坛内外表达的不满的政治实质。退出《不扩散条约》可以合法地被用作一种政治工具，以挑战目前的现状，即五个国家声称有权根据《不扩散核武器条约》拥有核武器，并实现核武器对所有人都是非法的核秩序。

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When is it legitimate to abandon the NPT? Withdrawal as a political tool to move nuclear disarmament forward

ABSTRACT Treaties can be denounced and withdrawn from unilaterally and collectively. We ask when it would be legitimate to abandon the NPT, a treaty that 50 years ago committed states to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, but still has not delivered on the latter. The end of the NPT is a taboo subject in the arms control community that sees it as the cornerstone of the nuclear order. We draw on literature on the legitimacy of and exit from international institutions. We especially explore the political substance of the discontent that the non-nuclear weapons states have expressed in and outside the NPT forum. Exiting the NPT can legitimately be used as a political tool to challenge the current status quo where five states claim a right to possess nuclear weapons based on the NPT, and to achieve a nuclear order where nuclear weapons are illegal for all.

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来源期刊

Contemporary Security Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

14.60

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： One of the oldest peer-reviewed journals in international conflict and security, Contemporary Security Policy promotes theoretically-based research on policy problems of armed conflict, intervention and conflict resolution. Since it first appeared in 1980, CSP has established its unique place as a meeting ground for research at the nexus of theory and policy. Spanning the gap between academic and policy approaches, CSP offers policy analysts a place to pursue fundamental issues, and academic writers a venue for addressing policy. Major fields of concern include: War and armed conflict Peacekeeping Conflict resolution Arms control and disarmament Defense policy Strategic culture International institutions. CSP is committed to a broad range of intellectual perspectives. Articles promote new analytical approaches, iconoclastic interpretations and previously overlooked perspectives. Its pages encourage novel contributions and outlooks, not particular methodologies or policy goals. Its geographical scope is worldwide and includes security challenges in Europe, Africa, the Middle-East and Asia. Authors are encouraged to examine established priorities in innovative ways and to apply traditional methods to new problems.