大脑解码器有自己的本体论思维吗?回复尼古拉斯·罗斯

IF 0.9 2区 社会学 Q3 SOCIOLOGY
C. Halberg
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在最近发表在《身体与社会》(Body & Society)上的一篇文章中,尼古拉斯·罗斯(Nikolas Rose)思考了他认为大脑解码技术最新发展可能带来的历史本体论含义。他认为,这些技术体现了一个前提,即大脑是精神状态和过程的真正所在地,因此,一种新的唯物主义思想本体论可能正在通过技术论证而不是通过哲学解决而出现。在这篇回复中,我提供了一些对这种说法持怀疑态度的理由。我认为,所讨论的本体论几乎没有什么特别新颖的东西,技术不能独立于某种哲学倾向而在这些问题上证明任何东西,所讨论的本体论是否能保证其作为唯物主义思想本体论的主张,至少是一个开放的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do Brain Decoders Have an Ontological Mind of Their Own? Response to Nikolas Rose
In a recent article published in Body & Society, Nikolas Rose considers what he takes to be possible historical–ontological implications of recent developments in brain-decoding technologies. He argues that such technologies embody the premise that the brain is the real locus of mental states and processes, hence that a new materialist ontology of thought may be in the process of emerging through technological demonstration rather than through philosophical resolution. In this reply, I offer some reasons for being sceptical about such claims. I argue that the ontology in question hardly amounts to anything particularly new, that technologies cannot demonstrate anything in these matters independently of philosophical inclinations of some kind and that it is at least an open issue whether the ontology in question can secure its claim to be a materialist ontology of thought.
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来源期刊
Body & Society
Body & Society SOCIOLOGY-
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: Body & Society has from its inception in March 1995 as a companion journal to Theory, Culture & Society, pioneered and shaped the field of body-studies. It has been committed to theoretical openness characterized by the publication of a wide range of critical approaches to the body, alongside the encouragement and development of innovative work that contains a trans-disciplinary focus. The disciplines reflected in the journal have included anthropology, art history, communications, cultural history, cultural studies, environmental studies, feminism, film studies, health studies, leisure studies, medical history, philosophy, psychology, religious studies, science studies, sociology and sport studies.
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