内幕交易和欺诈性股票回购

Q4 Social Sciences
Duncan S. Wang, Xiang Li, Hui Tang, Yicheng Sun
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引用次数: 1

摘要

股票回购向投资者传递信息,影响资本市场的股票价格。通常当一家公司宣布股票回购时,该公司的股价会立即上涨。因此,一些内部人士可能会利用这种模式,制造一个虚假的回购事件。当股价因公告而上涨时,内部人士可以以更高的价格出售所持股票,这是欺诈性股票回购的内幕交易。本文以2013年至2019年中国股市2272家回购公司为样本,研究了围绕回购事件的短期反应。主要发现围绕回购事件的内幕交易较为普遍,其中欺诈性回购内幕交易最为严重。我们还发现,代理问题越严重、公司治理越差的公司更容易发生欺诈性回购,每股收益和总资产回报率越低、公司规模越大、杠杆率越高的公司更容易发生欺诈性回购事件。本文可以为区分正常回购与欺诈回购提供实践指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Insider Trading and Fraudulent Share Repurchase
Share repurchase conveys information to investors and influences stock price in capital market. Normally when a company announces share buyback, the company’s stock price will rise immediately. Thus, some insiders may take advantage of this pattern and create a fake repurchase event. When the stock price rises due to the announcement, the insiders can sell their shares at a higher price, which is insider trading of fraudulent share repurchase. We study short-term reactions around the repurchase event, using a sample of 2,272 repurchase firms in the Chinese stock market from 2013 to 2019. The main finding is that insider trading around the repurchase event is prevalent and insider trading of fraudulent repurchase is most serious. We also find that companies with more serious agency problem and poorer corporate governance are more likely to engage in fraudulent repurchase, and that companies with lower EPS and ROA, higher firm size and higher leverage are more prone to have fraudulent repurchase event. This paper can provide practical guidance in differentiating the normal repurchase from the fraudulent repurchase.
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来源期刊
Credit and Capital Markets
Credit and Capital Markets Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
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