Book review: Self-Ownership, Property Rights, and the Human Body: A Legal and Philosophical Analyses

The human body is quite the normative puzzle. It raises many ‘ought’ questions for the lawyer and ethicist that are not easily answered. Can existing law, which is old and slow to evolve, adequately adapt to changes in the medico-legal landscape, wrought by technology that is new and rapidly evolving? In such an everchanging landscape, can the body and its parts and products sit neatly in an existing legal category or would this be putting new wine in old bottles; does it instead merit a category all of its own? How can property, an institution that developed to address very different problems than those posed by modern biotechnology, possibly be of use? These are but some of the questions addressed by Professor Quigley in this magisterial work of scholarship concerned with ownership and the body, a work which harnesses and synthesises much legal, ethical and philosophical debate in aid of its argument, but remains an eminently readable account of a fascinating (and hotly contested) area of scholarly inquiry. ‘Property’, as Penner notes, ‘is a bore . . . an annoying old idea that, given half the chance, will sit down beside you and maunder on about its past glory. Mention something topical though and property will be at a loss’. Not so, says Quigley, (and ultimately Penner too I might add!), property gives us an established and pragmatic framework for dealing with things and a comprehensive set of doctrines for dealing with such core issues as the allocation of rights and the transfer of these rights. The key question, which comes through forcefully in the book, is not whether we should recognise property rights in human biomaterials – medical professionals, hospitals, researchers and clinics already exercise such rights – it is whether such rights should be extended