Legislative Gridlock, Executive Unilateralism, and Policy Governance: The Implications of U.S. Nuclear Power Policymaking for Korean Politics

How do U.S. administrations occasionally achieve significant policy progress and sustain policy governance despite the usual political turmoil that seemingly bogs down the legislative process? This paper answers this question theoretically, takes an empirical look into U.S. nuclear power policy as an illustrating case, and draws comparative implications for South Korean politics. The theoretical rationale employed here suggests that political conflicts and legislative gridlock motivate the president and administrative actors to bypass the legislative process and unilaterally resort to the use of executive tools in pursuing their policy agendas. Neither able to lead by themselves nor willing to take the blame for policy failures, calculating lawmakers would condone executive unilateralism by strategically acquiescing and would try for rent-seeking by ex post facto oversight. This theoretical rationale is supported by an inquiry into executive-legislative relations with respect to U.S. nuclear power policymaking. Comparatively, however, South Korean politics features no such dual presence of executive unilateralism and strategic condoning by the legislature, consequently suffering chronic woes regarding policy governance. The difference between the two countries is explained in terms of strategic calculations, or a lack thereof, on the part of legislators and executive officials. The presence or absence of these strategic calculations, in turn, depends on the varying degrees of partisan rigidity and the (in)effectiveness of legislative oversight measures.