{"title":"澳大利亚昆士兰州故意不相称的政策结果和对森林砍伐的管制","authors":"Henry Boer","doi":"10.1111/1467-8500.12593","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <p>This paper analyses the strategic interests that inform deforestation policies in Australia, and the variance in policy selections over time. A theory of deliberate policy disproportionality is used to analyse 20 years of regulatory reform in Queensland, focusing on the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Application of the framework to this case suggests that political executives were prone to deliberately adopt (dis)proportionate policies as a strategic response to either manage or capitalise on stakeholder support or opposition to any proposed legislative change. The high variance in (dis)proportionate deforestation policies is attributed to how political executives respond to claims made by competing constituencies regarding the costs versus benefits of successive reforms. During key reform phases, policy under-reaction was the norm, and political executives intentionally limited the scope and effectiveness of the VMA 1999 due to perceived impacts on the agricultural sector. Political executives were highly responsive to the emotional investment of rural constituents and averse to introducing policies that required difficult trade-offs. Elections offered strategic opportunities for delivering more proportionate policies that balanced public environmental benefits with economic impacts, as evidenced by a conditional deforestation ban introduced between 2004 and 2012 and reinstated in 2018.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Points for practitioners</h3>\n \n <div>\n <ul>\n \n <li>Variance in Queensland's deforestation policy over time can be attributed to the intentional decisions by political executives to limit or expand the scope of regulations as a strategic response to stakeholder expectations.</li>\n \n <li>Political executives were responsive to the costs versus environmental impacts/benefits of any deforestation reforms, but prone to policy under-reaction when the priority was managing the emotive reactions from rural constituencies.</li>\n \n <li>More proportionate regulations, such as the partial deforestation ban of 2004, aimed to balance environmental benefits with compensation for landholders but were only implemented when electorally beneficial.</li>\n \n <li>Stakeholders have a significant influence on disproportionate deforestation policy design and governments will need to manage competing claims to deliver more durable policy outcomes.</li>\n </ul>\n </div>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47373,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of Public Administration","volume":"83 1","pages":"50-68"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Deliberate disproportionate policy outcomes and regulating deforestation in Queensland, Australia\",\"authors\":\"Henry Boer\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1467-8500.12593\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <p>This paper analyses the strategic interests that inform deforestation policies in Australia, and the variance in policy selections over time. A theory of deliberate policy disproportionality is used to analyse 20 years of regulatory reform in Queensland, focusing on the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Application of the framework to this case suggests that political executives were prone to deliberately adopt (dis)proportionate policies as a strategic response to either manage or capitalise on stakeholder support or opposition to any proposed legislative change. The high variance in (dis)proportionate deforestation policies is attributed to how political executives respond to claims made by competing constituencies regarding the costs versus benefits of successive reforms. During key reform phases, policy under-reaction was the norm, and political executives intentionally limited the scope and effectiveness of the VMA 1999 due to perceived impacts on the agricultural sector. Political executives were highly responsive to the emotional investment of rural constituents and averse to introducing policies that required difficult trade-offs. Elections offered strategic opportunities for delivering more proportionate policies that balanced public environmental benefits with economic impacts, as evidenced by a conditional deforestation ban introduced between 2004 and 2012 and reinstated in 2018.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Points for practitioners</h3>\\n \\n <div>\\n <ul>\\n \\n <li>Variance in Queensland's deforestation policy over time can be attributed to the intentional decisions by political executives to limit or expand the scope of regulations as a strategic response to stakeholder expectations.</li>\\n \\n <li>Political executives were responsive to the costs versus environmental impacts/benefits of any deforestation reforms, but prone to policy under-reaction when the priority was managing the emotive reactions from rural constituencies.</li>\\n \\n <li>More proportionate regulations, such as the partial deforestation ban of 2004, aimed to balance environmental benefits with compensation for landholders but were only implemented when electorally beneficial.</li>\\n \\n <li>Stakeholders have a significant influence on disproportionate deforestation policy design and governments will need to manage competing claims to deliver more durable policy outcomes.</li>\\n </ul>\\n </div>\\n </section>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47373,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Australian Journal of Public Administration\",\"volume\":\"83 1\",\"pages\":\"50-68\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Australian Journal of Public Administration\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8500.12593\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Australian Journal of Public Administration","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8500.12593","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
Deliberate disproportionate policy outcomes and regulating deforestation in Queensland, Australia
This paper analyses the strategic interests that inform deforestation policies in Australia, and the variance in policy selections over time. A theory of deliberate policy disproportionality is used to analyse 20 years of regulatory reform in Queensland, focusing on the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Application of the framework to this case suggests that political executives were prone to deliberately adopt (dis)proportionate policies as a strategic response to either manage or capitalise on stakeholder support or opposition to any proposed legislative change. The high variance in (dis)proportionate deforestation policies is attributed to how political executives respond to claims made by competing constituencies regarding the costs versus benefits of successive reforms. During key reform phases, policy under-reaction was the norm, and political executives intentionally limited the scope and effectiveness of the VMA 1999 due to perceived impacts on the agricultural sector. Political executives were highly responsive to the emotional investment of rural constituents and averse to introducing policies that required difficult trade-offs. Elections offered strategic opportunities for delivering more proportionate policies that balanced public environmental benefits with economic impacts, as evidenced by a conditional deforestation ban introduced between 2004 and 2012 and reinstated in 2018.
Points for practitioners
Variance in Queensland's deforestation policy over time can be attributed to the intentional decisions by political executives to limit or expand the scope of regulations as a strategic response to stakeholder expectations.
Political executives were responsive to the costs versus environmental impacts/benefits of any deforestation reforms, but prone to policy under-reaction when the priority was managing the emotive reactions from rural constituencies.
More proportionate regulations, such as the partial deforestation ban of 2004, aimed to balance environmental benefits with compensation for landholders but were only implemented when electorally beneficial.
Stakeholders have a significant influence on disproportionate deforestation policy design and governments will need to manage competing claims to deliver more durable policy outcomes.
期刊介绍:
Aimed at a diverse readership, the Australian Journal of Public Administration is committed to the study and practice of public administration, public management and policy making. It encourages research, reflection and commentary amongst those interested in a range of public sector settings - federal, state, local and inter-governmental. The journal focuses on Australian concerns, but welcomes manuscripts relating to international developments of relevance to Australian experience.