中国高管薪酬与银行风险

IF 0.9 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Business Letters Pub Date : 2023-03-26 DOI:10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.62-67

Qiubin Huang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

高管薪酬是银行公司治理的重要机制，但其对银行风险的影响尚不明确。基于中国上市银行的样本，我们发现2007-2008年期间高管薪酬与银行风险之间存在显著的正相关关系。这一发现对模型规范、所使用的风险度量以及高管薪酬的计算方法都是稳健的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Executive compensation and bank risk in China

Executive compensation is an important mechanism of corporate governance for banks, but its effect on bank risk remains inconclusive. Based on a sample of banks listed in China, we uncover a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation and bank risk during the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to model specifications, the risk measures used, and the way to calculate executive compensation.

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来源期刊

Economics and Business Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Economics and Business Letters is an open access journal that publishes both theoretical and empirical quality original papers in all economics and business fields. In addition, relevant discussions on current policy issues will be considered for the Policy Watch section. As general strategy of EBL, the journal will launch calls for papers for special issues on topics of interest, generally with invited guest editors. The maximum length of the letters is limited to 2,500 words.