雅克·e·c·海曼斯,南加州大学国际关系副教授

Q2 Social Sciences
J. Hymans
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引用次数: 0

摘要

对俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京来说更有可能。在这里和其他地方一样,民族主义民粹主义言论可能是由更重要的因果因素引起的政策的影响:民族主义民粹主义可能是效应大于原因。关于唐纳德·特朗普总统反驳《2019年美国导弹防御评论》(第14-15、19页),人们可以说,在某些情况下,这种不可预测性可以合理地符合美国的利益。关于国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯和参谋长联席会议主席马克·米利将军将自己纳入核武器指挥链,以防止特朗普总统最严重的过度行为(第15页),我们能自信地说,这些过度行为存在于特朗普的民族主义民粹主义中,而不是一系列其他偏见和特质吗?(民族主义者?)民粹主义者更有可能通过推特进行交流,这一发现令人着迷,尽管这是否会使他们的威胁和保证或多或少可信(和危险)是一个悬而未决的问题。民族主义民粹主义者更有可能破坏支撑全球秩序的机构,这一说法也很重要。特朗普总统在2018年退出伊朗核协议是一个例子——普京总统吞并克里米亚和特朗普总统对北约的态度也是如此(第17-18页)——但在这里,尚不清楚是特朗普的民族主义民粹主义起了作用。如果能在更长的时间内分析所有这些政策,以及民族主义民粹主义领导人在造成这些政策中的作用,那将是一件有趣的事情。埃尔多安依靠个人外交获得俄罗斯导弹防御系统(第19页)是许多领导人更喜欢亲自会面、交换信息和了解其他领导人的案例之一,民族主义民粹主义在这方面的作用需要进一步探索。最终,Meier和Vieluf呼吁“更多的实证数据”和“以更全面和系统的方式详细说明民族主义民粹主义者的政策”(第22页)。我希望,这份答复中的评论可以作为这一努力的起点,并帮助梅尔和维埃卢夫以及其他人继续进行这项重要而有希望的研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Jacques E. C. Hymans, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Southern California
more possible for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Here as elsewhere, nationalist-populist rhetoric may be the effect of policies that are caused by more important causal factors: nationalist populism may be more effect than cause. Regarding President Donald Trump contradicting the 2019 US Missile Defense Review (pp. 14–15, 19), one can argue that such unpredictability can under some conditions rationally serve US interests. Regarding Defense Secretary James Mattis and General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inserting themselves into the nuclear-weapons chain of command to prevent the worst excesses of President Trump (p. 15), can we confidently say that these excesses resided in Trump’s nationalist populism and not a range of other biases and idiosyncrasies? The finding that (nationalist?) populists are more likely to communicate via Twitter is fascinating, although whether this makes their threats and assurances more or less credible (and dangerous) is an open question. The claim that nationalist populists are more likely to damage institutions underpinning global order is also important. President Trump walking away from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018 is cited as an example—as is President Putin’s annexation of Crimea and President Trump’s approach to NATO (pp. 17–18)—but here again, it is not clear that it is Trump’s nationalist populism doing the work. It would be interesting to see an analysis of all such policies over a longer period of time and the role of nationalist-populist leaders in causing them. Erdogan’s reliance on personal diplomacy to acquire a Russian missile-defense system (p. 19) is one case among many in which leaders prefer to meet, exchange information, and get to know other leaders personally, and the role of nationalist populism here needs to be further explored. Ultimately, Meier and Vieluf call for “more empirical data” and “specifics of nationalist populists’ policies in a more comprehensive and systematic manner” (p. 22). I hope that the comments in this response might serve as a starting point for that effort and help Meier and Vieluf and others continue this important and promising research.
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来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
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