革命和内战期间的在位者、挑战者和人口

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS
K. Hausken, Mthuli Ncube
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们认为革命和内战涉及在位者、挑战者和民众。革命被分为八种结果。在四种结果中,既有压迫发生(被视为向民众提供低于门槛的福利,如公共产品)。其他四个结果(福利提供超过阈值)中出现了迁就。现任者和挑战者互相争斗。在任者可能赢得并保持权力,也可能失败,从而导致僵局或联盟。在代价高昂的对峙中,没有人会退缩,谁会掌权存在不确定性。在一个成本较低的联合政府中,现任者和挑战者合作、妥协并协商他们的分歧。如果民众成功地反抗现任者,挑战者就会取代现任者。1961年至2011年间的87场革命,包括最近的阿拉伯之春革命,被归类为这八种结果。在镇压时期,在位者在46次革命中失败,在21次革命中掌权,在12次革命中建立联合政府。在妥协的情况下,现任者在七次革命中失败,在一次革命后建立联合政府。这87次革命是按地理区域和时期分类的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The incumbent, challenger, and population during revolution and civil war
We consider revolutions and civil war involving an incumbent, a challenger, and the population. Revolutions are classified into eight outcomes. In four outcomes incumbent repression occurs (viewed as providing sub-threshold benefits such as public goods to the population). Accommodation occurs in the other four outcomes (benefits provision above a threshold). The incumbent and challenger fight each other. The incumbent may win and retain power or else lose, thereby causing standoff or coalition. In a standoff, which is costly, no one backs down and uncertainty exists about who is in power. In a coalition, which is less costly, the incumbent and challenger cooperate, compromise, and negotiate their differences. If the population successfully revolts against the incumbent, the challenger replaces the incumbent. Eighty-seven revolutions during 1961–2011, including the recent Arab spring revolutions, are classified into the eight outcomes. When repressive, the incumbent loses 46 revolutions, remains in power through 21 revolutions, and builds a coalition after 12 revolutions. When accommodative, the incumbent loses seven revolutions and builds a coalition after one revolution. The 87 revolutions are classified across geographic regions and by time-period.
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CiteScore
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