Phillip McCalman, L. Puzzello, Tania Voon, A. Walter
{"title":"面向中国的外商投资筛选:跨学科视角*","authors":"Phillip McCalman, L. Puzzello, Tania Voon, A. Walter","doi":"10.4337/cilj.2023.01.06","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Screening of inward foreign investment in numerous countries worldwide has heightened in recent years for a range of reasons, one of which is the volume of Chinese outward investment. Moulding screening policies around concerns about Chinese investment has been a common pattern, particularly among developed countries and allies of the United States. The application of screening measures to Chinese investments in particular is also seen in recent practice in numerous countries. These developments create potential inconsistencies with international investment law, at least for those countries with an international investment agreement with China. The 2020 arbitral award in Global Telecom v Canada shows that even a provision that explicitly excludes investment screening decisions from a bilateral investment treaty may not apply to prevent all related investment treaty claims. The increased use of screening as a policy tool, with respect to China and otherwise, also raises questions about economic rationale and impact. Put simply, blocking a foreign investment proposal may have negative effects on shareholders, jobs and the economy itself, while even the existence of a restrictive screening regime and the threat of the imposition of conditions on a deal may dampen the appeal for foreign investors.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Inward foreign investment screening targets China: interdisciplinary perspectives*\",\"authors\":\"Phillip McCalman, L. Puzzello, Tania Voon, A. Walter\",\"doi\":\"10.4337/cilj.2023.01.06\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Screening of inward foreign investment in numerous countries worldwide has heightened in recent years for a range of reasons, one of which is the volume of Chinese outward investment. Moulding screening policies around concerns about Chinese investment has been a common pattern, particularly among developed countries and allies of the United States. The application of screening measures to Chinese investments in particular is also seen in recent practice in numerous countries. These developments create potential inconsistencies with international investment law, at least for those countries with an international investment agreement with China. The 2020 arbitral award in Global Telecom v Canada shows that even a provision that explicitly excludes investment screening decisions from a bilateral investment treaty may not apply to prevent all related investment treaty claims. The increased use of screening as a policy tool, with respect to China and otherwise, also raises questions about economic rationale and impact. Put simply, blocking a foreign investment proposal may have negative effects on shareholders, jobs and the economy itself, while even the existence of a restrictive screening regime and the threat of the imposition of conditions on a deal may dampen the appeal for foreign investors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4337/cilj.2023.01.06\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4337/cilj.2023.01.06","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Screening of inward foreign investment in numerous countries worldwide has heightened in recent years for a range of reasons, one of which is the volume of Chinese outward investment. Moulding screening policies around concerns about Chinese investment has been a common pattern, particularly among developed countries and allies of the United States. The application of screening measures to Chinese investments in particular is also seen in recent practice in numerous countries. These developments create potential inconsistencies with international investment law, at least for those countries with an international investment agreement with China. The 2020 arbitral award in Global Telecom v Canada shows that even a provision that explicitly excludes investment screening decisions from a bilateral investment treaty may not apply to prevent all related investment treaty claims. The increased use of screening as a policy tool, with respect to China and otherwise, also raises questions about economic rationale and impact. Put simply, blocking a foreign investment proposal may have negative effects on shareholders, jobs and the economy itself, while even the existence of a restrictive screening regime and the threat of the imposition of conditions on a deal may dampen the appeal for foreign investors.