如何评估专利:利润损失和专利损害赔偿的简单公式

Youngseo Yoo, S. Magee
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引用次数: 0

摘要

专利只有在法庭上被强制执行时才有价值。本文的目的是衡量当竞争公司非法进行侵权销售时专利所有者的利润损失。我们的微观经济学方法计算了存在侵权者的两家公司双寡头垄断均衡,并将其与相同市场但侵权者被移除的情况进行了比较。第二种均衡代表法律认可的单一企业专利垄断。我们推导出一个单一的等式,表示侵权人支付给专利权人的利润损失百分比。我们将产品需求、两家公司的边际成本、产量、市场份额和价格纳入方程。本文的贡献有三点。首先,我们推导出最简单的双头垄断/垄断损害方程,将所有经济影响转化为单个百分比损害数。第二,损害百分比乘以专利权人的实际利润(在侵权仍在进行的情况下)等于侵权人应向法院支付的专利权人损失利润的损害赔偿金额。第三,我们将我们的公式应用于典型的美国专利损失利润案例的小型试点研究,发现我们的公式的损害预测与联邦法院实际损害结果的相关性为0.71。我们还举例说明公式的用法。例如,如果专利所有人在其专利产品上的实际利润为1000万美元,并且存在侵权销售,那么如果两家公司的销售额相等,专利所有人的利润损失损失将为1250万美元。在两家公司的市场中,如果侵权人的市场份额增加到专利权人的三倍,专利损失将增加到4000万美元以上。通讯作者:Stephen P. Magee通讯作者电子邮件地址:magee@mail.utexas.edu首次投稿:2019年1月3日修改收到:2019年3月19日接受:2019年3月21日
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How to value a patent: a simple formula for lost profits patent damages
Patents are valuable only when they are enforced in court. The purpose of this paper is to measure a patent owner’s profits that are lost when a competing firm unlawfully makes infringing sales. Our microeconomic methodology computes a two-firm duopoly equilibrium with an infringer present and compares it with the same market but with the infringer removed. The second equilibrium represents a legally sanctioned single-firm patent monopoly. We derive a single equation representing the lost profits damage percent to be paid to the patent owner by the infringer. We incorporate product demand, both firms’ marginal costs, output, market shares, and prices in our equation. There are three contributions of this paper. One, we derive the simplest duopoly/monopoly damage equation we have seen that captures all the economic effects into a single percentage damage number. Second, that damage percent multiplied times the patent owner’s actual profits (with infringement ongoing) equals the dollar damages the infringer should pay in court for the patent owner’s lost profits. Third, we apply our formula to a small pilot study of classic US patent lost profit cases and find that our equation’s damage predictions had a correlation of .71 with the actual Federal court damage outcomes. We also illustrate the use of the formula. For example, if a patent owner’s actual profits on its patented product was $10 million with infringing sales present, then lost profits damages due to the patent owner would be $12.5 million if the two firms’ sales were equal. Patent damages increase to over $40 million if the infringer’s market share increased to triple that of the patent owner in the two-firm market. Corresponding author: Stephen P. Magee Email address for corresponding author: magee@mail.utexas.edu First submission received: 3rd January 2019 Revised submission received: 19th March 2019 Accepted: 21st March 2019
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