税收攻击性如何影响股东财富?使用监管过渡的检查

IF 2 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shawn Xu, Wan-Shin Mo, Jacob Peng
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们考察了税收侵略性与企业价值之间的关系。我们利用台湾税收执法的变化,限制了企业追求积极税收策略的能力,我们发现在监管变化后,税收积极与企业价值之间的关系变得更加负相关。进一步的分析表明,对于那些更有可能成为更严格的税收执法目标的公司来说,这种负面变化更为明显。此外,我们没有发现强有力的证据表明公司治理在调节主要关系方面的影响。我们的研究结果似乎与以下观点一致:监管成本的潜在增加可能超过更严格的税收执法在限制内部人收入转移方面的好处,从而加剧了我们研究环境中激进税收立场与股东财富之间的冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Does Tax Aggressiveness Affect Shareholder Wealth? An Examination Using a Regulatory Transition
We examine the relation between tax aggressiveness and firm value. Using a tax enforcement change in Taiwan that limits firms’ abilities to pursue aggressive tax strategies, we document that the relation between tax aggressiveness and firm value becomes more negative after the regulatory change. Further analyses reveal that the negative change is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to be targeted by the stricter tax enforcement. In addition, we do not find strong evidence on the impact of corporate governance in moderating the main relation. Our results seem to be consistent with the argument that potential increases in regulatory costs may outweigh the benefit of the stricter tax enforcement in constraining insiders’ income diversion, intensifying the conflict between aggressive tax positions and shareholder wealth in our research setting.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The aim of The International Journal of Accounting is to advance the academic and professional understanding of accounting theory, policies and practice from the international perspective and viewpoint. The Journal editorial recognizes that international accounting is influenced by a variety of forces, e.g., governmental, political and economic. Thus, the primary criterion for manuscript evaluation is the incremental contribution to international accounting literature and the forces that impact the field. The Journal aims at understanding the present and potential ability of accounting to aid in analyzing and interpreting international economic transactions and the economic consequences of such reporting. These transactions may be within a profit or non-profit environment. The Journal encourages a broad view of the origins and development of accounting with an emphasis on its functions in an increasingly interdependent global economy. The Journal also welcomes manuscripts that help explain current international accounting practices, with related theoretical justifications, and identify criticisms of current policies and practice. Other than occasional commissioned papers or special issues, all the manuscripts published in the Journal are selected by the editors after the normal double-blind refereeing process.
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