{"title":"逻辑在形而上学理论化中的作用","authors":"D. Goswick","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"73 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing\",\"authors\":\"D. Goswick\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/mp-2021-0032\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43147,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"73 - 80\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0032\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.