丘吉尔综合大楼。特殊关系的兴衰

IF 0.3 3区 社会学 Q2 HISTORY
J. Ellison
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在加沙、埃及和土耳其。第三,在阿拉伯之春期间和之后的中东不稳定的背景下,真主党及其赞助人伊朗的崛起,以及后者的核项目,突出了以色列和海湾君主国之间合作的重要性,以对抗波斯湾和中东其他地区的一些共同敌人。最后,自奥巴马政府执政以来,美国从中东撤出,海湾君主制国家的精英们认为,以色列,尤其是内塔尼亚胡,可能会影响特朗普的中东政策,并对美国国会产生强大影响。考虑到这一假设,内塔尼亚胡2015年3月在国会发表的讲话在他自己的政治舞台上采取反对美国总统的立场就不足为奇了,但对于海湾君主国来说,这仍然是令人印象深刻的一步。尽管内塔尼亚胡未能阻止《联合全面行动计划》(JCPOA)和4个月后签署的伊朗核协议,但他仍然在海湾君主国的媒体和统治精英中获得了重要的分数。单独来看,这些支柱中的每一个都足以令人信服地解释1993年奥斯陆协议后以色列和海湾君主国之间关系的转变,但正是所有这些变化的交集使得琼斯和古赞斯基的论点如此有说服力。一个小缺陷是,虽然作者嵌入了广泛的二手来源,但他们也采用了四次口头采访和一些他们多年来与以色列情报精英进行的非正式谈话。考虑到情报精英进行秘密外交的性质,以及无法接触到记录此类活动的以色列国家档案记录,在档案来源稀缺的情况下,口头证据成为了比平时更重要的金块。考虑到这一点,人们会希望在书中更多地突出这些情报精英的声音。即使在以色列和阿联酋于2020年8月13日宣布关系“正常化”之前,这本书仍然是一本非常值得推荐的教科书,对于包括本科生、研究生、从业者和学者在内的广泛受众来说,这是一本非常有用的读物。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Churchill Complex. The Rise and Fall of the Special Relationship
in Gaza, Egypt and Turkey. Third, set against the instability of the Middle East during and after the Arab Spring, the rise of Hezbollah and its patron Iran, and the latter’s nuclear project, highlighted the importance of the cooperation between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies against some common enemies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East. Last, American retrenchment away from the Middle East since the Obama administration and the underlying assumption by the Gulf Monarchies’ elite that Israel, especially Netanyahu, could influence Trump’s policies on the Middle East and have a strong influence on the US Congress. When this assumption is taken into account, it is unsurprising that Netanyahu’s address to Congress in March 2015 took an opposing stand against an American president in his own political playground, but it was nevertheless an impressive step for the Gulf Monarchies. Although Netanyahu failed to stop the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Iranian deal, which was signed four months later, he still scored important points with the Gulf Monarchies’ media and the ruling elite. Separately, each of these pillars is compelling enough to explain the shift in the relations between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies after the 1993 Oslo accords, but it is the intersection of all these changes which makes Jones and Guzansky’s argument so persuasive. One minor flaw would be that while the authors embed a wide range of secondary sources, they also employ four oral interviews and some informal chats they have conducted over the years with Israel’s intelligence elite. Given the nature of covert diplomacy undertaken by the intelligence elite and the lack of access to Israel’s state archival records that document such activities, oral evidence becomes golden nuggets which weigh even more than usual when apprised at a time archival sources are scarce. With this in mind, one would wish to have a bit more of those intelligence elite voices featured more prominently in the book. Even before the announcement of ‘normalization’ of relations between Israel and the UAE on 13 August 2020, which made this book still more topical, it was a highly recommended textbook and a very useful read for a wide range of audiences that encompasses undergraduates, post-graduate students, practitioners and academics.
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