粘性CEO薪酬的制度监督

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting

Journal of Applied Business Research Pub Date : 2018-02-21 DOI:10.19030/JABR.V34I2.10131

Daecheon Yang, Kyoungwon Mo

{"title":"粘性CEO薪酬的制度监督","authors":"Daecheon Yang, Kyoungwon Mo","doi":"10.19030/JABR.V34I2.10131","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in both mitigating the degree of downward-sticky CEO compensation and alleviating the undesirable effects of the sticky compensation on shareholder wealth. Particularly, we parallel the literature on “pay for performance” and institutional monitoring role to critically examine the measure of fluctuating pay-for-performance sensitivity, re-characterize the asymmetric compensation-performance link, and then capture managerial rent extraction. We find that sticky CEO compensation is significantly and negatively associated with firm value. Further, we find that institutional ownership decreases the compensation stickiness in underperforming firms and ameliorates its value-deteriorating effect.","PeriodicalId":40064,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Business Research","volume":"34 1","pages":"309-324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Institutional Monitoring Of Sticky CEO Compensation\",\"authors\":\"Daecheon Yang, Kyoungwon Mo\",\"doi\":\"10.19030/JABR.V34I2.10131\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in both mitigating the degree of downward-sticky CEO compensation and alleviating the undesirable effects of the sticky compensation on shareholder wealth. Particularly, we parallel the literature on “pay for performance” and institutional monitoring role to critically examine the measure of fluctuating pay-for-performance sensitivity, re-characterize the asymmetric compensation-performance link, and then capture managerial rent extraction. We find that sticky CEO compensation is significantly and negatively associated with firm value. Further, we find that institutional ownership decreases the compensation stickiness in underperforming firms and ameliorates its value-deteriorating effect.\",\"PeriodicalId\":40064,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Applied Business Research\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"309-324\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-02-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Applied Business Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.19030/JABR.V34I2.10131\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Applied Business Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.19030/JABR.V34I2.10131","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究考察了机构投资者在缓解CEO薪酬向下粘性程度和缓解粘性薪酬对股东财富的不良影响方面的监督作用。特别是，我们将关于“绩效薪酬”和机构监督作用的文献进行了比较，以批判性地检验绩效薪酬敏感性波动的衡量标准，重新描述不对称薪酬-绩效联系，然后捕捉管理层的租金提取。我们发现，粘性CEO薪酬与公司价值显著负相关。此外，我们发现机构所有权降低了表现不佳企业的薪酬粘性，并改善了其价值恶化效应。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Institutional Monitoring Of Sticky CEO Compensation

This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in both mitigating the degree of downward-sticky CEO compensation and alleviating the undesirable effects of the sticky compensation on shareholder wealth. Particularly, we parallel the literature on “pay for performance” and institutional monitoring role to critically examine the measure of fluctuating pay-for-performance sensitivity, re-characterize the asymmetric compensation-performance link, and then capture managerial rent extraction. We find that sticky CEO compensation is significantly and negatively associated with firm value. Further, we find that institutional ownership decreases the compensation stickiness in underperforming firms and ameliorates its value-deteriorating effect.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Applied Business Research Business, Management and Accounting-Business and International Management

CiteScore

0.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) welcomes articles in all areas of applied business and economics research. Both theoretical and applied manuscripts will be considered for publication; however, theoretical manuscripts must provide a clear link to important and interesting business and economics applications. Using a wide range of research methods including statistical analysis, analytical work, case studies, field research, and historical analysis, articles examine significant applied business and economics research questions from a broad range of perspectives. The intention of JABR is to publish papers that significantly contribute to these fields.