{"title":"可想象语境中的编码:Zalta意向性理论与Bourgeois-Gironde准编码概念之比较","authors":"Valentina Luporini","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0027","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In (Bourgeois-Gironde, S. 2004. “On Zalta’s Notion of Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts.” Metaphysica 5), the author proposes a survey of Zalta’s Object Theory (Zalta, E. N. 1983. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company; Zalta, E. N. 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge: MIT Press) and, more specifically, of the Modal Axiom of Encoding (MAE). MAE claims that if something x possibly encodes a property F, then x necessarily encodes F. According to Bourgeois-Gironde, MAE fails to account for intentional phenomena which occur in conceivability-contexts. His solution is based on the notion of quasi-encoding: x quasi-encodes F iff x possibly encodes F. In this paper, I show that Bourgeois-Gironde’s concern is misguided and that Zalta’s framework captures the conceivability-phenomena at issue by modeling Husserl’s notion of Noemata. I then argue that his solution is superior to Bourgeois-Gironde’s. The philosophical significance of such a discussion nonetheless goes well beyond the debate between these two authors. Indeed, Zalta’s theory of Noemata is only sketched and needs to be further explored to see, on the one hand, whether and how Object Theory successfully describes the behavior of objects in conceivability-contexts, and, on the other hand, to test the efficacy of its primitive notions that are – as the contemporary debate on Neomeinongianism largely shows – anything but uncontroversial.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding\",\"authors\":\"Valentina Luporini\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/mp-2021-0027\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract In (Bourgeois-Gironde, S. 2004. “On Zalta’s Notion of Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts.” Metaphysica 5), the author proposes a survey of Zalta’s Object Theory (Zalta, E. N. 1983. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company; Zalta, E. N. 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge: MIT Press) and, more specifically, of the Modal Axiom of Encoding (MAE). MAE claims that if something x possibly encodes a property F, then x necessarily encodes F. According to Bourgeois-Gironde, MAE fails to account for intentional phenomena which occur in conceivability-contexts. His solution is based on the notion of quasi-encoding: x quasi-encodes F iff x possibly encodes F. In this paper, I show that Bourgeois-Gironde’s concern is misguided and that Zalta’s framework captures the conceivability-phenomena at issue by modeling Husserl’s notion of Noemata. I then argue that his solution is superior to Bourgeois-Gironde’s. The philosophical significance of such a discussion nonetheless goes well beyond the debate between these two authors. Indeed, Zalta’s theory of Noemata is only sketched and needs to be further explored to see, on the one hand, whether and how Object Theory successfully describes the behavior of objects in conceivability-contexts, and, on the other hand, to test the efficacy of its primitive notions that are – as the contemporary debate on Neomeinongianism largely shows – anything but uncontroversial.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43147,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0027\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0027","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
[摘要]《资产阶级-吉伦特》,2004。“论萨尔塔在可想象语境中的编码概念”在《形而上学》第五章中,作者对扎尔塔的客体理论(Zalta, E. N. 1983)进行了考察。抽象对象:公理化形而上学导论。多德雷赫特:雷德尔出版公司;Zalta, E. N. 1988。内涵逻辑和意向性形而上学。剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社),更具体地说,是编码模态公理(MAE)。MAE声称,如果某物x可能编码属性F,那么x必然编码F。根据Bourgeois-Gironde的观点,MAE不能解释发生在可想象情境中的有意现象。他的解决方案是基于准编码的概念:x准编码F, x可能编码F。在本文中,我表明布尔乔亚-吉伦特的关注是被误导的,Zalta的框架通过模拟胡塞尔的Noemata概念来捕捉争议的可想象现象。我认为他的解决方案优于资产阶级吉伦特的解决方案。然而,这种讨论的哲学意义远远超出了这两位作者之间的争论。事实上,Zalta的Noemata理论只是一个草图,需要进一步的探索,一方面,对象理论是否以及如何成功地描述了可想象环境中的对象行为,另一方面,测试其原始概念的有效性-正如当代关于新美诺尼主义的辩论在很大程度上表明-任何事情都是没有争议的。
Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding
Abstract In (Bourgeois-Gironde, S. 2004. “On Zalta’s Notion of Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts.” Metaphysica 5), the author proposes a survey of Zalta’s Object Theory (Zalta, E. N. 1983. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company; Zalta, E. N. 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge: MIT Press) and, more specifically, of the Modal Axiom of Encoding (MAE). MAE claims that if something x possibly encodes a property F, then x necessarily encodes F. According to Bourgeois-Gironde, MAE fails to account for intentional phenomena which occur in conceivability-contexts. His solution is based on the notion of quasi-encoding: x quasi-encodes F iff x possibly encodes F. In this paper, I show that Bourgeois-Gironde’s concern is misguided and that Zalta’s framework captures the conceivability-phenomena at issue by modeling Husserl’s notion of Noemata. I then argue that his solution is superior to Bourgeois-Gironde’s. The philosophical significance of such a discussion nonetheless goes well beyond the debate between these two authors. Indeed, Zalta’s theory of Noemata is only sketched and needs to be further explored to see, on the one hand, whether and how Object Theory successfully describes the behavior of objects in conceivability-contexts, and, on the other hand, to test the efficacy of its primitive notions that are – as the contemporary debate on Neomeinongianism largely shows – anything but uncontroversial.