美国“大而不倒”政策的起源

IF 0.4 Q3 HISTORY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
George Nurisso, E. Prescott
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文将现代美国银行业“大到不能倒”政策的起源追溯到1972年对12亿美元的联邦银行(Bank of the Commonwealth)的救助。它描述了这次救助以及1984年对伊利诺伊大陆银行的救助。在此期间,由于州际银行限制导致的市场集中是大多数救助的一个因素,人们提出了对系统性风险的担忧,以证明对小得惊人的银行的救助是合理的。最后,这一时期的大多数救助都依赖于联邦存款保险公司对本质原则和美联储贷款的使用。对这一原则的讨论用于说明对监管机构的法律约束如何随着时间的推移而变得不那么具有约束力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Origins of too-big-to-fail policy in the United States
This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.
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来源期刊
Financial History Review
Financial History Review HISTORY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES-
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
期刊介绍: Financial History Review is the international forum for all scholars with interests in the development of banking, finance, and monetary matters. Its editors deliberately seek to embrace the broadest approach to publishing research findings within this growing historical specialism. Articles address all aspects of financial and monetary history, including technical and theoretical approaches, those derived from cultural and social perspectives and the interrelations between politics and finance. These presentations of current research are complemented by somewhat shorter pieces, specifically conceived as aids to research. Each issue contains a substantial review section, and every complete volume contains an annual bibliography.
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