{"title":"宪法与罗尔斯自由的限度","authors":"G. Sinnott","doi":"10.1017/S1352325220000178","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the scope of John Rawls's theory of liberty. It first develops an account of how this theory, which Rawls presents in largely abstract terms, applies in specific cases. It then argues that this account reveals that the scope of Rawls's theory of liberty is surprisingly narrow and that it does not include such seemingly obvious liberal rights as the freedom to engage in the sexual behavior of one's choice or to have access to pornography.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"124 - 155"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325220000178","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN LIBERTY\",\"authors\":\"G. Sinnott\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S1352325220000178\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT This paper examines the scope of John Rawls's theory of liberty. It first develops an account of how this theory, which Rawls presents in largely abstract terms, applies in specific cases. It then argues that this account reveals that the scope of Rawls's theory of liberty is surprisingly narrow and that it does not include such seemingly obvious liberal rights as the freedom to engage in the sexual behavior of one's choice or to have access to pornography.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44287,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Legal Theory\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"124 - 155\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325220000178\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Legal Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325220000178\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legal Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325220000178","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN LIBERTY
ABSTRACT This paper examines the scope of John Rawls's theory of liberty. It first develops an account of how this theory, which Rawls presents in largely abstract terms, applies in specific cases. It then argues that this account reveals that the scope of Rawls's theory of liberty is surprisingly narrow and that it does not include such seemingly obvious liberal rights as the freedom to engage in the sexual behavior of one's choice or to have access to pornography.
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