{"title":"逻辑形式:形式化的有效性和多样性","authors":"G. Brun","doi":"10.12775/llp.2023.016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Formalizations in first-order logic are standardly used to represent logical forms of sentences and to show the validity of ordinary-language arguments. Since every sentence admits of a variety of formalizations, a challenge arises: why should one valid formalization suffice to show validity even if there are other, invalid, formalizations? This paper suggests an explanation with reference to criteria of adequacy which ensure that formalizations are related in a hierarchy of more or less specific formalizations. This proposal is then compared with stronger criteria and assumptions, especially the idea that sentences essentially have just one logical form","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Logical Forms: Validity and Variety of Formalizations\",\"authors\":\"G. Brun\",\"doi\":\"10.12775/llp.2023.016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Formalizations in first-order logic are standardly used to represent logical forms of sentences and to show the validity of ordinary-language arguments. Since every sentence admits of a variety of formalizations, a challenge arises: why should one valid formalization suffice to show validity even if there are other, invalid, formalizations? This paper suggests an explanation with reference to criteria of adequacy which ensure that formalizations are related in a hierarchy of more or less specific formalizations. This proposal is then compared with stronger criteria and assumptions, especially the idea that sentences essentially have just one logical form\",\"PeriodicalId\":43501,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Logic and Logical Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Logic and Logical Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2023.016\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LOGIC\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2023.016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LOGIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
Logical Forms: Validity and Variety of Formalizations
Formalizations in first-order logic are standardly used to represent logical forms of sentences and to show the validity of ordinary-language arguments. Since every sentence admits of a variety of formalizations, a challenge arises: why should one valid formalization suffice to show validity even if there are other, invalid, formalizations? This paper suggests an explanation with reference to criteria of adequacy which ensure that formalizations are related in a hierarchy of more or less specific formalizations. This proposal is then compared with stronger criteria and assumptions, especially the idea that sentences essentially have just one logical form