Ripeness in Negotiating with Proscribed Terrorist Groups

Abstract Since the original formulation of ripeness theory, a growing number of conflicts have involved armed groups designated as terrorist organizations. Can conflicts involving terrorist groups also become ripe for negotiations? This article addresses this question by examining how proscription affects the two key mechanisms that can make a conflict ripe for the onset of negotiations: mutually hurting stalemates and the willingness to look for a way out. This article proposes that proscription expands the power asymmetry between states and non-state actors and empowers hardliners, reducing the likelihood that both sides perceive a mutually hurting stalemate. Proscription can also hinder the ability to look for a way out by placing legal constraints on engagement, reducing trust, polarizing inter-group relations and interfering with the ability of third parties to create incentives for negotiations. This article briefly considers these dynamics within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, showing how a terrorism focus has increased the power asymmetry between Hamas and the Israeli state, has reinforced military responses over diplomatic solutions and has undermined both the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate and the belief of the two sides that a way out is possible through negotiations.