信用建设还是信用崩溃?信用建造者贷款对美国消费者行为和市场效率的影响

IF 6.8 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Jeremy Burke, Julian C. Jamison, Dean S. Karlan, Kata Mihaly, Jonathan Zinman
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引用次数: 4

摘要

随机鼓励设计产生信用建设者贷款(CBL)对消费者信用评分的零平均影响。但机器学习算法表明,零是由于明显的、抵消的治疗效果,这取决于基线分期付款信贷活动。对先前存在的贷款义务的拖欠导致了负面影响,这表明增加CBL过度扩张了一些消费者,并对其他贷款人产生了负面外部性。更有利的是,CBL的使用会在分数提高方面产生积极的选择。CBL实践的简单改变,特别是供应商筛选和信贷局报告,可以减轻对消费者和市场的负面影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Credit Building or Credit Crumbling? A Credit Builder Loan’s Effects on Consumer Behavior and Market Efficiency in the United States
A randomized encouragement design yields null average effects of a credit builder loan (CBL) on consumer credit scores. But machine learning algorithms indicate the nulls are due to stark, offsetting treatment effects depending on baseline installment credit activity. Delinquency on preexisting loan obligations drives the negative effects, suggesting that adding a CBL overextends some consumers and generates negative externalities on other lenders. More favorably for the market, CBL take-up generates positive selection on score improvements. Simple changes to CBL practice, particularly to provider screening and credit bureau reporting, could ameliorate the negative effects for consumers and the market.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.00
自引率
2.40%
发文量
83
期刊介绍: The Review of Financial Studies is a prominent platform that aims to foster and widely distribute noteworthy research in financial economics. With an expansive editorial board, the Review strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary focus of paper selection is based on the quality and significance of the research to the field of finance, rather than its level of technical complexity. The scope of finance within the Review encompasses its intersection with economics. Sponsoring The Society for Financial Studies, the Review and the Society appoint editors and officers through limited terms.
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