董事会的被动

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
C. Yung
{"title":"董事会的被动","authors":"C. Yung","doi":"10.1093/rcfs/cfac012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.","PeriodicalId":44656,"journal":{"name":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Passivity on the Board of Directors\",\"authors\":\"C. Yung\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/rcfs/cfac012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44656,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Corporate Finance Studies\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Corporate Finance Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

首席执行官向担任顾问的董事会提出战略计划。每位董事都支持、反对或推迟发言,直到其他董事采取行动。延迟的选择抑制了对处于平衡状态的糟糕计划的异议。延迟对重要决策和拥有声誉良好、几乎不会犯错的首席执行官的公司有着明显的影响。我调查了排序的作用,也就是说,什么时候应该邀请董事发言,这是他们信号准确性的函数。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Passivity on the Board of Directors
A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
17.80
自引率
1.80%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信