退出、控制与政治:资产管理人资本主义下的结构性权力与公司治理

IF 4.1 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Benjamin Braun
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引用次数: 12

摘要

金融相对于非金融部门的力量正在发生变化。宏观经济发展和金融创新减少了金融行为者的退出选择,从而削弱了基于退出的结构性力量。与此同时,股权越来越集中在大型资产管理公司手中,从而增加了基于控制的权力。这篇文章记录了这些趋势,然后研究了资产管理公司是否行使权力,以及为什么尽管他们是普遍股东,但他们没有引导企业行为走向脱碳。本文认为,在今天的美国,政治因素支配着基于控制权的权力的使用,而不是假设股东和经理之间有秩序、真诚的互动。资产管理公司的公司治理政策屈从于——越来越不一致——最大化管理资产的目标,同时避免监管反弹。与基于退出的权力不同,基于控制的权力受到高度可见性的限制,因此很容易被政治化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exit, Control, and Politics: Structural Power and Corporate Governance under Asset Manager Capitalism
The power of finance vis-à-vis the nonfinancial sector is changing. Macroeconomic developments and financial innovations have reduced financial actors’ exit options, thus diminishing exit-based structural power. At the same time, shareholdings have become more concentrated in the hands of large asset managers, thus increasing control-based power. This article documents these trends, before examining whether asset managers wield their power and why, despite being universal shareholders, they have not steered corporate behavior toward decarbonization. Rather than assuming orderly, good-faith interactions between shareholders and managers, this article argues that in the United States today, political considerations govern the use of control-based power. Asset managers’ corporate governance policies are subservient to the—increasingly inconsistent—goals of maximizing assets under management while avoiding regulatory backlash. Unlike exit-based power, control-based power is constrained by being highly visible and, therefore, easily politicized.
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来源期刊
Politics & Society
Politics & Society Multiple-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
4.20%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.
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