50 Years of CSIS—Ideas and Policy in Indonesia Peter McCawley, Centre for Strategic and international StudiesJakarta, 2021, Pp. 342 + xxiv ISBN: 978 9791 29542 0

Peter McCawley has produced an excellent record of the contribution the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has made to Indonesia and beyond. It documents the intertwined evolution of Indonesian society and the Centre during an eventful five decades. It is a heartening story, reaffirming that people with vision, dedication and perseverance can make a difference—shining a ray of hope through the darkness which threatens to descend on much of the planet a quarter of the way into the 21st century.

It was dark in Indonesia in 1965 when the ‘Old Order’ dominated by President Sukarno crumbled into instability and widespread bloodshed. Chapter 1 describes the uncertainty of the next several years. Harry Tjan Silahali and Jusuf Wanandi were among the student activists who saw the need to shape a new way to work towards a just and prosperous Indonesia.

In each case, they sought to identify policy options, independently from, but available to government. For example, Wanandi was heavily involved in changing policy on Papua from plunder to assistance that could increase Papuan support for the remaining part of Indonesia. Their wide-ranging reports to government sought to incorporate lessons from international experience along with assessments of domestic realities and opportunities.

The work of these founders began to attract favourable attention; gaining support from two generals (Moertopo and Soedjono) who were trusted special advisors to Soeharto. That vital political ‘cover’ made it possible to expand the scope of research and advice, bringing in some more people and to raise finance. By September 1971, it was possible to launch the CSIS.

Clear principles and objectives helped the founders to attract talented people, including Clara Joewono, Hadi Soesastro, and Daoed Joesoef; several of whom had studied overseas. Once on board, researchers were encouraged to express their own views on how to promote these objectives.

The CSIS team set to work; to anticipate issues needing attention, then be first in the field with practical advice. They did not always succeed in efforts to shape policy, but were always ready to respond to emerging realities.

CSIS research gave early priority to improving Indonesia's economic prospects. McCawley's history surveys the vast research output of CSIS, including many articles and broad surveys of the economy. Examples include a collection of articles on The Acceleration and Modernisation of 25 Year's Development, published in 1972, which served as a guide to government priorities during the 1970s.2 Several such volumes followed over the years, identifying emerging challenges and opportunities.

All of the Centre's work reflected an awareness that Indonesia's prosperity depended on the rest of the world. In addition to sound domestic policy-making, it was essential to have good and peaceful relations within its own region, to be able to compete confidently in international markets, and to attract international investment to help accelerate technological capacity. Therefore, a consistent theme of CSIS's contribution to policy-making was, as McCawley puts it: to argue the case of structural adjustment, trade reform and openness in Indonesia's relations with the international economy.

By early 1980s, CSIS had earned the reputation of influencing and explaining Indonesia's foreign policy interests. Wanandi and others created strong links with political and business leaders and with thinktanks in ASEAN, then Japan, then throughout the Asia Pacific. CSIS led the effort to create a cooperative second-track network around the region, strengthening ASEAN and facilitating the subsequent emergence of region-wide economic and security communications.

The Centre has consistently sought to make its work accessible. Over time, there was more and more to communicate. McCawley cites, and quotes from, a huge list of publications, reflecting stunning productivity by a small group of people dedicated to the development of their nation.

The government has been the main target audience for CSIS, but the researchers have been well aware that sustained policy-making success depends on far more than convincing a few Ministers at any one time. It is also essential to build widespread support for new ideas, which often cause short-term pain for long-term gain. That requires patience—to explain the reasons for reforms needed to make headway towards either justice or prosperity. Then to keep explaining, not just once, but over and over again, in various ways to different groups.

The Centre has communicated its ideas through two regular journals: the English language Indonesian Quarterly and Analisa in Bahasa Indonesia. At well-chosen times, when new ideas were needed or likely to be sought, CSIS published volumes that pointed to risks and opportunities in many policy areas. For example, Reflections on a Half Century of Independence, published in 1999, contains chapters on social and institutional matters, on international relations, as well as on the internal dynamics and external challenges to Indonesia's economy. Most of the chapter authors were CSIS researchers, complemented by invited experts.

During the 1980s, the breadth and quality of policy-oriented research was rewarded by growing respect for, and willingness to make use of CSIS opinions. As well as contributing to policy formation, this helped to attract new talent to CSIS, including Mari Pangestu. The institution encouraged new recruits to acquire additional skills, finding opportunities for them to gain post-graduate education, including in the USA and Australia. This enhancement of confidence and capacity was to prove vital to CSIS ability to cope with dramatic changes.

CSIS certainly benefited from the early support of two of President Soeharto's key advisers; then after they died in the mid-1980s, from Benny Moerdani as chief of the military. Jusuf Wanandi sent regular memos to the President, which were mostly well received. The mutually comfortable relation with the government ended in 1987, when Wanandi dared to suggest that the President might consider taking a back seat in running the government and give more authority to his senior Coordinating Ministers. Soeharto was displeased, cut his ties to CSIS and instructed his ministers to do the same.

The end of a close partnership with Government made it considerably harder to raise finance for research. After some retrenchment, CSIS found new sources of revenue, including from research commissioned by the private sector. On the positive side, the break with the government made it easier for CSIS to reach out to other groups—in particular, Muslim scholars and students. There was wider scope to promote longer-term reforms within Indonesia.

Freed from close ties to the administration, CSIS scholars found it easier to comment on political issues—and there was much to comment on as the New Order had begun to fray during the 1990s. Their work sought to address widespread concerns about the declining quality of the political process.

Soeharto's hold on power faced a growing challenge from other political parties and, in mid-1997, Indonesia's economy was severely disrupted by a financial crisis in much of East Asia. Inevitably, CSIS became involved in both the political and economic crises and became seen to be critical of the government. That led to demonstrations outside their building; Jusuf Wanandi and his brother Sofjan, were questioned by police. CSIS remained resolutely independent through this difficult period when an economic crisis contributed to political upheaval and the end of Soeharto's presidency in mid-1998.

A succession of short-lived Presidencies changed the environment for CSIS. New freedom for expression led to domestic competition among thinktanks, which was welcomed by CSIS.

The scope of research continued to widen to issues thrust to prominence by President Habibie's decisions for drastic decentralisation of powers and to initiate the fraught transition towards the independence of Timor Leste. CSIS also sought to find ways for resolving tension between the central government and potentially secessionist provinces, Aceh and Papua.

Indonesia entered a calmer period after 2004. CSIS continued to be productive, participating in discussions with government departments, universities and other thinktanks, alongside ongoing policy-oriented research.

Domestic research priorities included concern with productivity and pricing (especially the problems created by fuel price subsidies), ceaselessly advocating structural adjustment towards more efficient markets and resisting ever-present pressures for protectionism.

The quality of all of this work contributed to renewed mutually respectful links with government. Mari Pangestu was appointed as Minister for Trade, where she contributed to a coherent outward-looking policy for international trade and investment. She also led the drive to create the ASEAN Economic Community.

CSIS has maintained its momentum. Raising funds remains difficult, but CSIS staff have always proved willing to step up to lead when needed. A few of the founders, including Jusuf Wanandi and Clara Joewono are still involved, providing encouragement and guidance to a steady stream of new research staff. The last (un-numbered) chapter contributed by Philips J Vermonte reveals how the agenda and capacity of the Centre has evolved, responding to new challenges, especially climate change.

CSIS helped the government when Indonesia chaired the APEC process in 2003 and is contributing to Indonesia's year to host the G20 in 2022. The new generation of researchers are ‘tech-savvy’, boosting capacity to gather and analyse data gathered from polls and surveys.

Peter McCawley seems to have been determined to avoid inserting his own views of the institution. The story emerges from the astoundingly wide range of CSIS work, its impact on Indonesia and the region, from carefully selected facts and apposite quotes from its staff, and from respected outside sources. The author's deep knowledge of Indonesia, its language, and close cooperation with CSIS over all of its 50 years made it possible for him to find, and often to translate, appropriate sources that illustrate the Centre's capacity for anticipation, realism and communications. Readers will come away from reading this history of CSIS with admiration for the institution—based on the its track record.

Peter's modesty precluded mentioning his own ongoing contributions to CSIS. That should not have prevented him from recounting some of the many ways Australian National University (ANU) scholars have supported CSIS. Peter Drysdale, Ross Garnaut and Hal Hill were close friends and colleagues of CSIS founders and researchers. Perhaps the most important and long-lasting connections were formed by CSIS sending their young staff and other potential leaders to study at ANU, including the current Executive Director, Yose Rizal.

Crafting the book largely from written sources has made it difficult to convey a sense of the way CSIS operated—with patient but persuasive advocacy, drawing in expertise from many sources to help make their case for good policy. McCawley comes closest to this by highlighting the immeasurable contribution of Hadi Soesastro to CSIS and to all of the Asia Pacific region.

Pak Hadi Soesastro was one of the Centre's first researchers and led CSIS as Executive Director, in three spells, for close to two decades. His admirable productivity and leadership were combined with wonderful personal skills, modesty, courtesy and loyalty. He encouraged many talented young people, including Mari Pangestu to join the Centre.

One highlight among Hadi's contributions: his role in the evolution of economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific. That began in the 1970s, when he was drawn into the annual series of Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conference of economists who set out the potential benefit of closer cooperation among the diverse group of Asia Pacific economies. That led to the second-track network of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), involving business leaders, government officials (in a private capacity) as well as researchers. Hadi was one of the keynote speakers at PECC's inaugural meeting in 1980, then became a long-serving research policy coordinator of the PECC network.

By 1989, PECC had set out a potential agenda for practical economic cooperation in the region, creating the conditions for Australian Prime Minister Hawke to launch consultations towards inter-governmental economic cooperation. During 1989, CSIS was the first to publish potential guiding principles for APEC—principles that would make it possible for ASEAN and other East Asian economies to accept the new process. Despite the distancing of CSIS by President Soeharto, Hadi and Jusuf Wanandi were included in the Indonesian delegation to APEC, led by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in November 1989.

Hadi worked with Mari Pangestu to help advance the APEC agenda. Mari organised the drafting of a code to facilitate two-way international investment among APEC economies. Hadi then skillfully shepherded the code to its adoption by the PECC Trade Policy Forum, then presented it to a meeting of APEC Senior Officials. By 1994, its substance was adopted by APEC leaders. Although voluntary, the code has served to shape the gradual evolution of investment policies of many Asia Pacific governments. As Trade Minister, Mari incorporated these principles into Indonesia's legislation.

The task of good thinktanks never ends. An immense challenge for all the world is the drift of democracies, including long-standing ones, towards autocracy. Southeast Asia is not immune. Constructive ideas from CSIS and its many partners may be able to cope with these threats. High-quality international public goods like CSIS will remain essential, seeking to persuade Indonesia and its neighbours to stay on track towards just and prosperous societies.